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The further from 9/11, the more vivid its scares remain in the collective conscience. 
This seems to justify perhaps what has become a persistent state of a global war on terror. A 
war which in turn has given rise to a persistent surge of violent extremists with resolve for a 
perpetual state of global warfare. Consequently, now more than before, there is everywhere a 
shared sense of insecurity and a parallel awareness of vulnerable statehood and state capacity. I 
argue in this article that the current state of affairs has serious implications for statehood, state 
responsibility, state obligation and state duties in various forms and spheres of meaningful 
governance.  I reassess how the principles of State responsibility and State duty can be 
meaningfully understood in light of current global security challenges to common notion of 
State monopoly to the use of force. I ask how culpability can be assessed and responsibility 
attributed to bring to end the scourges of terror by violent extremists. To that end, I explore 
practices, events, and cases to supply explanations and thus, lay conditions for accountability. 
 
Introduction 
During war and peace times, there is a question of State responsibility 
and what obligation sovereign States must legitimately and morally shoulder. 
This is particularly true during the so-called ‘war on terror;’ a war lacking the 
conventional warfare framework where the enemies, the Violent non State actors 
(VNSA), are illusive, and unpredictable with the capacity to morph into different 
forms in different contexts. Terror or terrorism, the object, is highly contested 
as lacking in an academic or political consensus in terms of definition.58 Is it an 
idea, an ideology or a barbaric strategy in posture? Be it as it may in the face of 
all of the upsurge in terrorist extremist activities in since 9/11, concerns have 
been raised about the increased vulnerability of the State; Statehood as well as 
its diminished coercive capacity. Sure enough, the continuous state of the global 
war on terror post 9/11 has not been helpful; instead it has ushered in with it an 
ambiguous sense of security.  
                                                            
58 See Wilkinson, Paul (1977) Terrorism and the Liberal State, London: Macmillan.  To Paul 
Wilkenson, a proclaimed expert on terrorism conceives of “terrorism in its broadest sense, as the 
use of intentionally indiscriminate violence - the systematic use of murder, injury, and destruction or threat 
of same -- as a means to create terror or fear, in order to achieve a political, religious, or ideological aim.”  
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In the international community, what once was a sovereign State’s 
enduring claim to the monopoly of the use of force within territorial borders is 
today highly contestable, and to a large measure, is in jeopardy.  From so-called 
failed states to the most powerful, there is no exception. In that sense the score 
card on the effort of contemporary domestic and international counter-terrorism 
goals, in the long haul, prompt more questions than the answers supplied. One 
of these questions is whether the all or nothing claim in the fight against 
terrorism has made the world a safer place today than yesterday. The continued 
mayhem caused by extremists, the Al-Qaeda of yesterday, ISIS of today and their 
extended affiliates around the world, and the new global jihadist59 insurgent 
types such as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)60 in Syria and Iraq, Boka-
Aram in Nigeria and Northern Cameroon, to name but a few, speaks volumes to 
any conclusion one may draw of a safer world, today. 
The recent movement by the United States to exclude persons, and 
justifications supplied to ban visitations and immigration from those parts of the 
world, speaks to the felt sense of global insecurity from the US perspective, and 
more importantly, to the confusion in sorting the appropriate measures for 
accountability. It also undoubtedly speaks to a corresponding vulnerability in 
the US capacity to properly counter precise dangers posed perhaps by 
immigrants apart from the violent extremists from these parts of the world.61 
Section 2 of the Executive Order 13769 of January 27, 2017 provides that: “It is 
the policy of the United States to protect its citizens from foreign nationals who 
intend to commit terrorist attacks in the United States; and to prevent the 
admission of foreign nationals who intend to exploit US immigration laws for 
malevolent purposes.” 
Recent Global Terrorism Index death statistics of terrorist attacks and 
fatalities show increase in terrorist activity by 80% in 2014 to its highest 
recorded level to date.62 This colossal in that, it is the largest ever year-on-year 
increase in deaths from terrorism recorded in 2014, rising from 18,111 in 2013 
to 32,685 in 2014. Indeed, the number of people who have died from terrorist 
activity has increased nine-fold since the year 2000.  With a much refined source 
of terror of “non-state terrorism” recorded, the Global Terrorism Database 
                                                            
59 The new insurgent types would be the global jihadist movements groups made of non-state 
actors composed of al Qaeda-affiliated and -inspired groups and individuals who see Al Qaeda 
not only as an organization but also as an ideology. 
60 The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also known as the Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL), 
currently controls about one-third of Iraq and Syria. They are a combination of: (a) revival of 
the al-Qaeda-sponsored Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) organization that tried to take over western 
Iraq 2003—2006, and Sunni Syrian rebel groups including the Nusra Front (Jabhat al Nusra), 
which also has ties to al Qaeda, see Shoshana Bryen and Michael Johnson “TO KNOW YOUR 
ENEMY: What is ISIS, Where did it Come From, and When Did the US Know it was There?” 
http://chainsoff.wordpress.com/2014/08/26/ 
61 See Executive Order 13769 of January 27, 2017, “Protecting the Nation from Foreign 
Terrorist Entry into the United States” 
“https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/02/01/2017-02281/...  
62 LaFree G. (2012) Generating Terrorism Event Databases: Results from the Global Terrorism 
Database, 1970 to 2008. In: Lum C., Kennedy L. (eds) Evidence-Based Counterterrorism Policy. 
Springer Series on Evidence-Based Crime Policy, vol 3. Springer, New York, NY 
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provides that more than 61,000 incidents resulted in 140,000 deaths between 
2000 and 2014.63 As depicted in Table 1A, of the 37 deaths from terrorism in 
Western countries in 2014, 18 fatalities took place in the United States in that 
year alone. In the eight other countries that reported a fatal terrorist attack, 
there were a combined total of 19 deaths from terrorist attacks.  
 















The Federal Bureau of Investigation bulletin with focus on the United States with 
implications around the world reports that terrorist extremists such as ISIS, Al-Qaeda and 
affiliated groups to include other Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVE), continue to 
attempt terroristic attacks on the US homeland. New tactics and tradecraft, the FBI report 
observes, have emerged which further complicates the innumerable threats facing the 
United States.64  The FBI report seemingly hinges on whether the reported terrorist threats 
                                                            
63 See The Global Terrorism Database (GTD): a database of incidents of terrorism from 1970 
onward to 2017 maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland, College Park. It is also the 
basis for other terrorism-related measures, such as the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) published 
by the Institute for Economics and Peace. 
64 See Lauren B. O’Brien, “The Evolution of Terrorism Since 911,” The FBI Law Enforcement 
Bulletin, (2011) http://www.fbi.gov /stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-
bulletin/september-2011/the-evolution-of-terrorism-since-9-11, Accessed June 8, 2012 and  
October 2, 2017 
Table 1.a 
Deaths	from	Terrorist	Attacks	in	Western	Countries	in	2014	
Country	 Deaths	 Attacks	 Country	 Deaths	 Attacks	
1	 United	States	 18	 19	 13	 Germany	 0	 12	
2	 Australia	 4	 7	 14	 Italy	 0	 7	
3	 Canada	 4	 2	 15	 Sweden	 0	 6	
4	 Belgium	 4	 1	 16	 Cyprus	 0	 4	
5	 Kosovo	 2	 1	 17	 Bosnia	Herzegovina	 0	 3	
6	 Austria	 2	 1	 18	 Macedonia	 0	 3	
7	 France	 1	 11	 19	 Spain	 0	 3	
8	 Czech	Republic	 1	 3	 20	 Bulgaria	 0	 1	
9	 Albania	 1	 2	 21	 Hungary	 0	 1	
10	 United	Kingdom	 0	 102	 22	 Iceland	 0	 1	
11	 Ireland	 0	 30	 23	 Netherland	 0	 1	
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were domestic to the United States and therefore unique, or international and therefore 
widespread and global. A 2010 study by Seung-Whan Choi (2010) presented causal 
explanation that tends to dampen the domestic terror source hypothesis. Choi suggests 
instead that “because ordinary citizens can peacefully resolve grievances through 
democratic rule of law systems, they lack the hopelessness and desperation that motivates 
international terrorist actions.”65 Consequently, from that view, legitimately held rule of 
law systems serve to insulate democracies from terrorist attacks from within.66  
      Choi therefore invites a thinking that differentiates the impact of terrorism into 
brands or types (i.e., home grown extremists versus international violent extremists) and 
political systems (i.e., democratic versus non-democratic or authoritarian regimes). In 
that view, “home grown domestic extremists” is a category quite distinct from 
“international terrorism.” Yet terrorist attacks of the kind of 9/11 and most recently ISIS’s 
gruesome targets in France and Belgium and before that Western journalists in Iraq and 
Syria, suggest the predominance and magnitude of trans-border flow of persons and to a 
larger extent, of terrorist groups. That is, it is possible to imagine that the ease of traveling 
from one point to another may exacerbate the movement of persons and also conclude 
that it may also facilitate the formation and movement of terror groups as well. For all its 
positives, “openness” and therefore the increased freedom in the movement of persons 
across borders, fosters opportunities for terrorist activities predisposed with insidious 
motives to destabilize international peace and security. This conclusion is not only critical 
but also controversial, as it invokes serious reconsiderations that are more likely to 
undermine than foster the free movements of persons.  
      This article focuses on the global impact of terror unleashed by Violent non-State 
Actors [VNSA]. It examines linkages between the principles of state responsibility, 
statehood and sovereignty, especially how these concepts can be properly understood in 
light of challenges posed by VNSAs within the rapid shifts in State practices in the post 
9/11 era. It questions whether statehood, an inherent aspect of a State, and therefore 
conferring sovereignty - a state’s ultimate liberty to define, as it sees fit, its domestic 
structures and more. To that end, the article contemplates (a) conditions under which 
States can be held responsible for their direct wrongful actions; and (b) conditions under 
which host States can be held responsible for acts of those that use their territories as safe-
haven to lunch attacks on other States or groups especially where they fail to act or 
incapable of doing so.   
     While the attribution of responsibility to a State for its direct action may be less 
complicated, attribution to a State for acts of a third party, for example, a Violent non-
State Actors (VNSA) party is almost always controversial. By definition VNSAs are 
elusive organizations that utilize illegal violence as the primary means to achieve political 
goals. These may include the use of unsanctioned forces which complicates any direct 
attribution of responsibility under the theory of Sate responsibility. As argued below, the 
continued growth of terrorist organizations since 9/11 suggests more, and not less anxiety 
among those who are the primary target States, notably the United States, Israel, and most 
European countries. Since 2001, the US Department of State Office of Counterterrorism 
has documented well over fifty groups and organizations as Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations (FTO) with well-known attack agendas against western interests (see 
Table 1b and c).67  Amongst those designated FTOs, ten at the very least have for avowed 
                                                            
65 Seung-Whan Choi. "Fighting Terrorism through the Rule of Law” (2010) 54 Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, (6) 840-966 
66 See Note 8 Seung-Whan Choi (2010: 941). 
67 Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (January 27, 2012). "Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations." www.state.gov. U.S. State Department. 
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purpose and dedication the elimination of the State of Israel, or to replace Israel with a 
Palestine Islamic State using violence at their primary vehicle.  The remaining forty FTOs 
on the list pursue a similar agenda but directed to other targets all over the world. 
      Astonishingly, from a much broader scale, the US Department of State Office of 
Counterterrorism also reports that over the past years there was a total of 6,771 
terrorist attacks worldwide which resulted in more than 11,000 deaths and more 
than 21,600 injuries. In addition, more than 1,280 people were kidnapped or taken 
hostage during the same period.68 
 
Table 1B – Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
Table 
1.b 
Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO)* 
(Non-State Actors) 
**As of October 2017** 
 Date 
Designated  
Group  Date 
Designated 
Group 
1 10/8/1997  Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)  32 12/17/2004 Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (formerly al-Qa'ida in Iraq) 
2 10/8/1997  Aum Shinrikyo (AUM)  33 6/17/2005  Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)  
3 10/8/1997  Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)  34 3/5/2008  Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B)  
4 10/8/1997  Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group) (IG)  35 3/18/2008  al-Shabaab  
5 10/8/1997  HAMAS  36 5/18/2009  Revolutionary Struggle (RS)  
6 10/8/1997  Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)  37 7/2/2009  Kata'ib Hizballah (KH)  
7 10/8/1997  Hizballah  38 1/19/2010  al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)  
8 10/8/1997  Kahane Chai (Kach)  39 8/6/2010  Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI)  
9 10/8/1997  Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) (Kongra-Gel)  40 9/1/2010  Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)  
10 10/8/1997  Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)  41 11/4/2010  Jundallah  
11 10/8/1997  National Liberation Army (ELN)  42 5/23/2011  Army of Islam (AOI)  
12 10/8/1997  Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)  43 9/19/2011  Indian Mujahedeen (IM)  
13 10/8/1997  Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)  44 3/13/2012 Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) 
14 10/8/1997  Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLF)  45 5/30/2012 Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB) 
15 10/8/1997  PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC)  46 9/19/2012  Haqqani Network (HQN)  
16 10/8/1997  Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)  47 3/22/2013  Ansar al-Dine (AAD)  
17 10/8/1997  Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front 
(DHKP/C)  
48 11/14/2013  Boko Haram  
18 10/8/1997  Shining Path (SL)  49 11/14/2013  Ansaru 
19 10/8/1999  al-Qa’ida (AQ)  50 12/19/2013  al-Mulathamun Battalion 
20 9/25/2000  Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)  51 1/13/2014  Ansar al-Shari'a in Benghazi 
21 5/16/2001  Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA)  52 1/13/2014  Ansar al-Shari'a in Darnah 
22 12/26/2001  Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM)  53 1/13/2014  Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia 
23 12/26/2001  Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT)  54 4/10/2014  ISIL Sinai Province (formally Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis)  
24 3/27/2002  Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB)  55 5/15/2014  al-Nusrah Front  
25 3/27/2002  Asbat al-Ansar (AAA)  56 8/20/2014  Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem (MSC)  
26 3/27/2002  al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)  57 9/30/2015  Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al Naqshabandi (JRTN)  
27 8/9/2002  Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's 
Army 
58 1/14/2016  ISIL-Khorasan (ISIL-K)  
28 10/23/2002  Jemaah Islamiya (JI)  59 5/20/2016 Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant's Branch in Libya (ISIL-Libya)  
29 1/30/2003  Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ)  60 6/30/2016 Al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent  
30 3/22/2004  Ansar al-Islam (AAI) 61 8/16/2017 Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) 
31 7/13/2004 Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)    
Source: US Department of State.  Bureau of Counterterrorism, October 2017, reassembled by author (M.G. Pufong). 
 
Criteria for FTO Designation:  
                                                            
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm., Accessed June 8, 2017; Also see most 
resent posting for September 2017 on Table 1b and 1c.  
68 See National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism: Annex of 
Statistical Information, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism “Country Reports on 
Terrorism 2012-17,” http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2017/210017.htm,  Assessed October 
1, 2017. 
33
et al.: Volume 1, Issue 2
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2017 5
Pufong: Terror, Insecurity, State Responsibility and Challenges: Yesterda
 
International Journal on Responsibility, Vol. I Issue 1.2 (May) 2018 
32 | P a g e  
 
The Legal Criteria for group Designation under Section 219 of the INA as amended in 2004 requires that (1) the organization 
upon which a FTO designation is visited upon is a foreign organization. (2) the organization must engage in terrorist activity, as 
defined in section 212 (a)(3)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)),* or terrorism, as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the 
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)),** or retain the capability and intent 
to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism, and (3) the organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of 
U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States. 
Identification and Designation:  
For identification and designation purposes, the Bureau of Counterterrorism in the State Department (CT) continually monitors 
the activities of terrorist groups active around the world to identify potential targets for designation. When reviewing potential 
targets, CT looks not only at the actual terrorist attacks that a group has carried out, but also at whether the group has engaged 
in planning and preparations for possible future acts of terrorism or retains the capability and intent to carry out such acts.  
Designation: 
Once a target is identified, CT prepares a detailed "administrative record," which is a compilation of information, typically 
including both classified and open sources information, demonstrating that the statutory criteria for designation have been 
satisfied. If the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury, decides to make 
the designation, Congress is notified of the Secretary’s intent to designate the organization and given seven days to review the 
designation, as the INA requires. Upon the expiration of the seven-day waiting period and in the absence of Congressional action 
to block the designation, notice of the designation is published in the Federal Register, at which point the designation takes 
effect. By law an organization designated as an FTO may seek judicial review of the designation in the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit not later than 30 days after the designation is published in the Federal Register.  
Unlike before when the INA provided that FTOs had to be re-designated every 2 years or the designation would lapse, under the 




Table 1C – Delisted Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
Table 1.c Delisted Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO)** 
 Date Removed from 
Designated Listing  
Name  Date Originally Designated  
1 10/8/1999  Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine -Hawatmeh Faction  10/8/1997  
2 10/8/1999  Khmer Rouge  10/8/1997  
3 10/8/1999  Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front Dissidents  10/8/1997  
4 10/8/2001  Japanese Red Army  10/8/1997  
5 10/8/2001  Tupac Amaru Revolution Movement  10/8/1997  
6 5/18/2009  Revolutionary Nuclei  10/8/1997  
7 10/15/2010  Armed Islamic Group (GIA)  10/8/1997  
8 9/28/2012  Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)  10/8/1997  
9 5/28/2013  Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) 10/11/2005  
10 7/15/2014  United Self Defense Forces of Colombia  9/10/2001  
11 9/3/2015  Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N) 10/8/1997  
12 12/9/2015  Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) 12/17/2004  
13 6/1/2017  Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) 10/8/1997  
 
**Delisting/Revocation of FTO Designation 
The act of delisting or revocation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) designation under the US Immigration and Nationality Act has 
three possible basis: First, that Secretary of State has determined that the circumstances that were the basis of the designation have changed 
in such a manner as to warrant a revocation; second, that the Secretary of State has determined that the national security of the United 
States warrants a revocation; and thirdly, that the Secretary of State may revoke a designation at any time. Further, that Any revocation 
shall take effect on the date specified in the revocation or upon publication in the Federal Register if no effective date is specified. The 
revocation of a designation shall not affect any action or proceeding based on conduct committed prior to the effective date of such 
revocation. 
Source: US Department of State. Bureau of Counterterrorism, October 2017, reassembled by author (M.G. Pufong) 
 
 
Methodology, Application & Outline 
 
     The methodological approach adopted in this article for assessment is primarily 
analytical and explanatory. Specifically, I use international incidents that depict State 
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practices, events, and court cases as case studies to explain outcome consistency or 
inconsistency with prevailing principle, practices and international norms. So for 
example, an invasion targeting the capture or to neutralize a Violent Non-State Actor 
under this approach would invite inquiry into many features of the context or the invasion 
in light of prevailing international principles. Elsewhere, Riesman and Willard (1988) 
confirm the relevance of using incidents as method of assessment.  Riesman and Willard 
argue that “incidents” frame the international disputes that shapes and reinforces elite 
expectations about the lawfulness of acts for which the appraisal of the relevance of 
international actors occurs in a non-formal setting.”69 
     In the first and second parts of this article I provide summary explanations 
associated with how one should understand the link between Statehood and State 
responsibility as important principles under international law. Both principles are further 
reiterated and their consequences made relevant in subsequent assessments of incidents of 
State behavior, practices, cases, and events on State responsibility. The third part of the 
article focuses on the principle of sovereignty and its practical implications for nation 
states. Specifically, I explore circumstances under which sovereignty may or may not 
confer to States the absolute right that absolve them from wrongful acts. Particular 
attention is directed to states that harbor violent terrorist groups. 
      The article concludes that under narrow circumstances, where a conduct or an 
incident can be attributed to a specific State – its actions or failure to act – international 
law and politics permits the use of force for its wrongful acts or for the acts of a violent 
non-State actor (VNSA) under its jurisdiction or control. Absent direct acknowledgment 
of responsibility for the initial transgression or the attribution of responsibility that links 
or inculpates the host State, the use of force is likely only where the host State is unable 
or unwilling to remove the source-of-threat from its territory. 
The last part of the article on the targeted use of drones and the invasion of 
Pakistan set forth the justification for permissible use of force. Specifically this section 
argues that the invasion and killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan’s territory falls under 
the latter “unwilling” category and therefore triggered the permissible use of force by the 
United States.  Above all, this article argues that under current status quo, any diminished 
impact on the State sovereign capacity and more important in terms of cost associated 
with the increased measures taken to avert global terrorism, is offset by rival gains in the 
long term security. This is particularly true for the international community absent the 
initial source-of-threat to its stability. 
 
Explaining Statehood and State Responsibility 
 
The most prominent form of violent conflict in the world today occurs within 
States rather than between them. Since 1945, over 75% of militarized disputes have been 
civil conflicts, i.e., non-international armed wars.70 With the increase in terrorist 
extremists (VNSA), who use domestic structure of States as safe-havens to launch attacks 
on other States, it triggers questions of distinctions and clarification of this important 
                                                            
69 Michael Riesman and Andrew R Willard, International Incidents: The Law That Counts in 
World Politics, (Princeton University Press 1998), vii-viii. 
70 Nils Petter Gleditsch; Håvard Strand; Mikael Eriksson; Margareta Sollenberg & Peter 
Wallensteen, “Armed Conflict 1946–99: A New Dataset,” Paper presented at the 42nd Annual 
Convention of the International Studies Association, Chicago, IL, 20–24 February 2001. 
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principle in international law and politics. To understand what really is State 
responsibility requires foremost that we disentangle what constitutes Statehood.  
 
The 1933 Montevideo Convention on Right and Duty of States which sets out the 
definition, rights, and duties of statehood is particularly instructive here.71 It outlines the 
four elements required for the claim of statehood that heretofore has been recognized as 
an accurate statement of customary international law. Inherent in them are specific 
attributes a State must possess, and which upon doing so, sets forth the basis for State 
responsibility.  Accordingly, these attributes require that a state possesses (a) a well-
defined territory; (b) a permanent population; (c) a government or an effective rule within 
the territory; and (d) independence or the competence to conduct international relations.  
In fact, these attributes differentiate States from so-called non-State actors or units such 
as belligerent communities (e.g., rebel groups), domestic protectorates (e.g., Indian 
nations), international organizations etc.  As shown in this article, the essence of 
statehood also conveys statuses that are associated with the various sets of rights and 
duties, and carry with them obligations and jurisdictional competences. While the 
Montevideo attributes have traditionally been viewed as legitimate standards that State 
must possess, serious debate between the constitutive and declarative views of statehood 
persists.72   
More recently, David Miller argued that the rights over territory standardly 
claimed by states can be separated into three main elements: the right of jurisdiction, the 
right to the territory's resources, and the right to control borders.73 Arguably, statehood 
and its derivative rights and duties under international law create a framework for extant 
State responsibility.  According to the 2001 (final) “Article on the Responsibility of States…” 
the principle of State responsibility embraces the conception that State rights and duties 
must be respected.  It outlines the conditions under which violators will be held to account 
for their action or inactions, as well as the consequences that flow from committing 
wrongs that violate State rights. It links wrongful acts to the direct State actions or to 
those that are indirectly the result of State inaction (ARSIWA, 2001).   
By connecting breach of rights and duties (norms) with responsibility and 
sanctions for breaches, State responsibility in the end forms the basis for implementing 
international law and obligation.  For example, Article 1 of all four Geneva Conventions is 
a key provision when it comes to determining State responsibilities under international 
humanitarian law (IHL).74 It provides that states are responsible to “respect and ensure 
respect” for the Conventions in all circumstances.  To respect, means that all state 
                                                            
71 See the "Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States,” Montevideo, Uruguay, 
December 26, 1933 Accessed Oct, 2017. 
72 For the constitutive basis of state see the 1815 Final Acts, Congress of Vienna and  for the 
declarative basis of statehood and also see the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties 
of States, 1933.  For further discussion, see Ian Brownlie Principles of Public International Law, 
(Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1958) and Hans Kelsen, Principles of International 
Law, (New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc 1952). 
73 See David Miller, Territorial Rights: Concept and Justification. (2012) 60 Political Studies, 
252–268. 
74 The Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949. Article 2 Convention (IV) relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. International Committee of the Red Cross, 
Geneva, 153-221, http://www.icrc. org/ihl.nsf/WebList? Read Form&id=380&t=com> 
Accessed November 25, 2017. 
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institutions, and all other individuals or bodies under their authority follow the rules of 
the Geneva Conventions.75  
 
Article 1 however, seems to apply only to traditional State actors.  The lack of the 
requisite attributes of statehood perhaps explains the lack of inclusion of non-state actors 
who even though very elusive, are also prevalent on the international stage through 
various trans-border activities. Also, the lack of territorial jurisdiction suggests that non-
State actors cannot absorb direct responsibility as understood under the traditional 
meaning of state responsibility. A question of significant interest for State responsibility, 
therefore, is under what circumstances can the wrongful act of a purely non-State actor 
be attributed to a traditional State actor as the host of a country where the action or 
wrongful act occurred?76   
To establish that state responsibility, the outcome of state action and therefore a 
consequence of statehood, is explained below. I further discuss other practical situations 
that may apply to the principles of State responsibility using case opinions of the 
International Court of Justice, the international arbitration tribunals, and human rights 
courts.  Finally, I provide a comprehensive understanding of the main principles of the 
law of State responsibility as an enforcement mechanism in international law, short of 
other options such as the use of force.   
 
State Responsibility as a Consequence of Statehood 
 
What is the link between state responsibility, state action, and statehood? The 
concept of statehood is central in establishing what in modern understanding is a State, 
and therefore whether a State by its actions or omissions breaches an international 
obligation, and incurs international responsibility.  This assumes first and foremost that 
the State indeed, is authentic.  The responsibility incurred is said to be either derived or 
is a consequences to its status and act(s) committed or omitted. Therefore the concept of 
statehood confers the status of a legal person and a subject under international law. As 
discussed below under attribution, this is an important concept because any attribution 
of State responsibility requires a determination based on specific attributes that a State 
must possess.77    
Beyond framing the rights and duties of statehood, the Montevideo Convention 
of 1933 establishes basic criteria that a State must possess to be recognized as a person 
under international law (See Section III above). These requirements are: a permanent 
population; a defined territory; a government; and lastly, the capacity to enter into 
relations with other states.78 By this action, the Convention effectively codified what is 
famously known as the declarative theory of statehood. It is this conception of Statehood 
that paved the way to the recognition of State responsibility as further grounds upon 
                                                            
75 See The Geneva Conventions, see Note 17 above. 
76  Shultz, Richard H, Douglas Farah, Itamara V. Lochard. (2004). "Armed Groups: A Tier-One 
Security Priority". INSS Occasional Paper (USAF Institute for National Security Studies, USAF 
Academy) (57) September http://www.usafa.edu/df/inss/OCP/ocp57.pdf Accessed November 
25, 2017. 
77 Again, recall that these attributes owe their formal origin from the Montevideo Convention 
on the Rights and Duties of States as agreed to and signed into effect by member states on 
December 26, 1933.  See Montevideo Convention, see Note 14 above 
78  See note 14  
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which a State can be held liable for certain conduct.  Article 3 of the Montevideo Convention 
for example, explicitly provides that "The political existence of a state is independent of 
recognition by the other states.”79   
 
The declarative theory of Statehood was further sustained in 1991 by the EEC 
Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia (commonly known as Badinter 
Arbitration Committee) which held that a state is defined by having a territory, a population, 
and a political authority.80  Its practical usefulness lies in the assertion that a State exists 
by law (de-jure), even if such a State (1) lack one of the attributes, or (2) some politically 
powerful entity elects not to recognize its existence.  The State of Palestine today is the 
clearest example yet.  It is recognized by many countries, but it does not have control 
over its claimed of the territory in Palestine and in spite of recent claims and movements 
in the United Nations’ towards statehood.81 That remains the case even if it has 
extraterritorial instrumentalities such embassies and consulates.82   
The declarative theory of statehood however, is in sharp contrast to the constitutive 
theory which steadfastly endorses the view of “recognition” as a primary requirement for 
statehood. The constitutive theory defines a State as a person under international law if, and 
only if, it is also recognized as a sovereign state by other states, especially the great powers.83  
Justification for this view is found in the logic that because new states cannot immediately 
become part of the international community or be bound by international law, the existing 
recognized nations do not have to respect international law in dealings with non-
recognized States.  
So as stated above, if state responsibility is a natural consequence of state 
statehood, being a state in either a de-jure or de-facto sense, is an important first step. 
Once it is established that statehood actually exists, and how it exists, under either the 
declarative or constitutive theory, it paves way to a fuller narrative of State responsibility.  
A showing that statehood exists in a particular instance therefore is foremost. Only upon 
doing so can a State be held to be liable for any purported wrongful act.  According to 
Article 1 of the 2001 (final) Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts (ARSIWA), “every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international 
responsibility of that State.”84 In an era increasingly thought to be transformative, from 
                                                            
79 See Montevideo Convention, note 8 above. 
80 Alain Pellet, “The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee, A Second Breath for the 
Self-Determination of Peoples,” (1982) 3 European Journal of International Law, (1): 178-185. 
81 Louis Charbonneau, “Palestinians win implicit U.N. recognition of sovereign state,”(2012) 
http://www.reuters.com /assets/ print?aid  =USBRE8AR0EG20121129, Thu, Nov 25 2017. 
82 A distinction is important here. Israel allows the Palestine National Authority to execute 
some functions in the Palestinian territories, depending on special area classification. Israel 
however, maintains minimal interference (retaining control of borders: air, sea beyond internal 
waters, land) in the Gaza strip and maximum in "Administrative Division of the Oslo Accords." 
Palestine therefore does not meet the clear definition of state under Montevideo. 
83 See "Final Act of Vienna," The Congress of Vienna, June 9, 1815. Encyclopedia Britannica, 
Accessed May 12, 2017. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/207113/Final-Act-of-
Vienna>.  
84 See The UN General Assembly, International Law Commission Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility, Resolution A/RES/56/83 of 12 December 2001; Also see James Crawford, The 
International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002) pp. 110-113, 121-123; James R. Crawford. The International Law 
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the rigid veil of statehood, the emphases on the principles of State responsibility and 
sovereignty is important, even if both concepts are often thought to be conflicting. It is a 
common observation that States in their sovereign capacity would not surrender their 
rights or create conditions that would entice them to accept responsibilities that would 
undermine those rights. States would even go as far as avoiding responsibilities in 
situations where they initially agreed to accept one. Such a scenario is too common 
because States reserve the power to assert for themselves the right to decide their own 
interest in everything, and to recognize no other authority above them in their relations 
when dealing with each other.85 
Thus, questions of state responsibility assume that once statehood is acquired, the 
emergent State incurs obligations for its action, inactions, or omissions arising from the 
new international status. To meet this standard and be held to accountable under 
international law, State action must constitute a breach of an international instrument or 
must be one that is not in conformity with its international obligation or custom.86 Such 
an obligation may entail the responsibility for the breach of an existing or newly 
formulated obligation that impacts one state or the entire community of nations and for 
which the new State is required to make reparation. The requirement for reparations – 
that is,  payments or other compensation offered as an indemnity for loss or damage87 
speaks to the measures that a new State is obligated to take if and when a showing is made 
establishing that the wrongful act committed constituted a breach of responsibility, and 
consequently, a violation of its responsibility. Lastly, reparations viewed as a form of 
sanction, can be also be applied to remedying the wrongful acts attributed to a State 
regardless of whether those acts were committed by its agents or private parties under 
the color of its orders. In the section below, I examine further events and cases that provide 
clarity to the link that exist between statehood and state responsibility.  
 
Statehood and State Responsibility 
 
What are the consequences of the legal personality of a State? When a State 
commits a wrongful act against another State or the international community, its breach 
of international law triggers the duty that it makes reparation for the harmful 
infringement of its obligation. Under such circumstances, the state is said to have 
breached state responsibility.  In this section, I provide and discuss four events and/or 
cases that shed light on statehood and state responsibility. 
Case-in-point A: In August 2008, the Italian government apologized for Italy’s 
occupation of Libya from 1911-1943. Italy thus paid the equivalent of $5,000,000,000 to 
                                                            
Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Crawford, James Crawford and S. Olleson. 
"The Nature and Forms of International Responsibility," In International Law, ed. M. Evans. 
(Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
85 See Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, (Princeton University Press, 
1999). 
86 See Article 12, ARSIWA, Note 21 above. 
87 See "Reparations." International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. 2008. Encyclopedia.com. 
(October 12, 2013). http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3045302236.html; also see Carl P 
Parrini and James I. Matray, "Reparations." Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy. 2002. 
Encyclopedia.com. (October 12, 2013). http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-
3402300133.html. 
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compensate for this long term breach of Libya’s territory. Italy further provided Libya 
with electronic monitoring devises on the Libyan coastline to help prevent clandestine 
migration to Italy.  Summarily, three elements combine to trigger State responsibility in 
the expectation that there is (a) the existence of a legal obligation recognized by 
international law, (b) an act or omission that violates that obligation, and (c) some loss or 
articulable damage caused by the breach of that obligation. Whether actual damage is 
required is the subject of intense debate.88  These elements are drawn from a variety of 
sources, including various judicial and arbitration awards.   
Case-in-point B: The previously Permanent Court International Justice in a 1928 case 
The Factory at Chorzow89 is another example.  In this case the PCIJ ruled that “it is a 
principle of international law and even a greater conception of all law that any breach of 
an engagement (responsibility to another State) involves an obligation to make 
reparation.”90 This, according to the Court, reflects the fact that all legal systems require 
those who cause harm through illegal or wrongful acts to take action to repair the harm 
they have caused. In that case Germany had sued Poland seeking reparations for Poland’s 
breach of its treaty obligation not to impound a German factory once built in Poland.    
In addition, human rights treaties and declarations adopted by the United Nations 
guarantee individual victims the right to a remedy, that is, access to justice and 
reparations in national proceedings. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 8, 
proclaims that "[e]veryone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national 
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted to him by the constitution or 
laws."91 This guarantee would, of course, include remedies for criminal acts that violate 
guaranteed rights. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights contains a 
similar guarantee in its Article 2(3).92 The UN Human Rights Committee overseeing 
compliance with the covenant has stated that when acts of torture occur, for example, a 
government is under a duty to: “Conduct an inquiry into the circumstances of [the 
victim's] torture, to punish those found guilty of torture and to take steps to ensure that 
similar violations do not occur in the future.”93 That committee has also called for 
investigation and prosecution in cases involving arbitrary executions and disappearances. 
All these acts constitute types of reparations for the wrong done for which State 
Responsibility are lodged.  Support for these principles can be found in many arbitration 
decisions. 
Case-in-point C:  In 1985, the crew of the Dutch-registered Greenpeace ship 
Rainbow Warrior protested French nuclear testing in the South Pacific.  The French 
                                                            
88 See Attila Tanzi, “Is Damage a Distinct Condition for the Existence of an International 
Wrongful Act?,” M. Spinedi and B. Simma (ed) in United Nations Codification of State 
Responsibility, (Oceana, Dobbs Ferry, 1987): 1-33. 
89 The Factory at Chorzow (1927), (Germ. v. Pol.), (PCIJ Ser. A, No. 9, at 29) Permanent Court 
International Justice,  
http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1927.07.26_chorzow.htm. 
90 See note 26 above  
91 "Universal Declaration of Human Rights," United Nations Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human rights, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/pages/WorldRecord.aspx 
92 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 
1976., http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cpr.html   
93 See UN Human Rights Council,  
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/HRCIndex.aspx 
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military security service “Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure” then destroyed 
the vessel in a New Zealand harbor, killing one of the crew members. New Zealand was 
obviously upset because of this ostensible breach of its territorial sovereignty.  France 
consequently agreed to transfer the responsible French agents to its base in the Pacific 
where they would remain for the last three years. The agents however, were subsequently 
repatriated to France without New Zealand’s consent.   
 
In a 1986 arbitration decision, the UN Secretary General ruled that “in such cases 
where a state sends its agents abroad to commit acts which are illegal under international 
or the domestic law of the target country, it is customary for the state to take 
responsibility for the act and issue compensation …even where its agents are usually 
granted immunity from local courts.”94 Essentially, France had incurred State 
responsibility for its agents and related violation of its commitments to incarcerate its 
agent in the geographical region, which was the scene of the crime.  The Rainbow Warrior 
Arbitration decision affirmed that “the legal consequences of breach of a treaty, including 
the determination of circumstances that may exclude wrongfulness …the appropriate 
remedies for breach, and subjects that belong to the customary law of state 
responsibility.”95 Even though the actions of the French state were not a threat to 
"international peace and security" per the UN Charter, they were widely held to be acts 
of international delinquency comprising breach of sovereignty and espionage.  
The Rainbow Warrior case is important at several levels. First, it bolsters the 
notion that there is a doctrine of non-intervention in international law and that states will 
be punished for contravening it. Second, it is also an interesting study of state 
responsibility, individual responsibility, use of force and reparations. Third and lastly, it 
supports the thesis that attribution is an important instrument in the goal of righting 
justice under certain situations. France incurred State responsibility for its agents and 
related violation of its treaty commitments because it presumably failed, per the treaty, 
to incarcerate its agent in the geographical region which was the scene of the crime. The 
logic of State responsibility here is that there had been an initial finding of fault or intent 
on the part of a State’s agents from which State responsibility was imputed. The failure 
of its agent to respect the terms the imprisonment was attributable to France as its 
responsibility, for which it was held to pay reparations.  It is not at all consequential nor 
does matter if French State was itself at fault or its agents.   The 1949 Corfu case below 
clarify this problem.  
Case-in-point D: The Corfu Channel Incident refers to three separate events 
involving Royal Navy ships in the Channel of Corfu which took place in 1946.96  During 
                                                            
94 See New Zealand v France --- United Nations Reports of the International Arbitral Award 
concerning the interpretation of two agreements, concluded on 9 July 1986 … arising from the 
Rainbow Warrior Affair, http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_XX/215-284.pdf.  
95 See Michael Pugh, "Legal Aspects of the Rainbow Warrior Affair," (1987). 36 The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, (3 July): 655–669; Rainbow Warrior (NEW 
ZEALAND v. FRANCE) France-New Zealand Arbitration Tribunal. 30 April 1990; and Philip 
Shabecoff, “France Must Pay Greenpeace $8 Million in Sinking of Ship,” Special to the New 
York Times, October 03, 1987, http://www.nytimes.com/1987/10/03/world/france-must-pay-
greenpeace-8-million-in-sinking-of. Accessed March 28, 2017.   
96 Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania); Assessment of Compensation, 15 XII 
49, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 15 December 1949, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid /402398c84.html [accessed 6 June 2017]. 
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the first incident, Royal Navy ships came under fire from Albanian fortifications. The 
second incident involved Royal Navy ships striking mines, and the third incident occurred 
when the Royal Navy conducted mine-clearing operations in the Corfu Channel, ventured 
into Albanian territorial waters, and Albania complained to the United Nations. On the 
question of whether a finding of fault or intent on the part of a State’s agents is required 
for State responsibility when one alleges State harms, the International Court of Justice 
in the 1949 Corfu Channel opinion suggests that some showing of fault is required for 
liability (responsibility) to arise.  Albania, the Court ruled, was responsible under 
international law for the explosions and for damages and loss of life resulting from them 
and that Albania owed a duty to Great Britain to pay compensation. In that case Great 
Britain had sued Albania when British naval vehicle hit mines that had been laid in an 
international strait off Albania’s coast.  Albania denied any knowledge of the presence of 
those mines in spite the rather suspicious circumstances.   The Court reasoned that in 
light of the facts of the case presented …. “it cannot be concluded …that the state 
[Albania] necessarily knew or ought to have known, of any unlawful act perpetrated 
therein, nor yet that it is necessarily knew, or should have known, the authors of the mine 
lying in the strait.”97  Restated, Albania knew… and should have known since its Coast 
Guards kept an eye [upon] and fired shots at potential violators and therefore fault is 
attributable to the State of Albania via its agents ….. who presumably laid the mines.” 
Finally, while judicial and academic writings are divided on the showing of fault, 
most writings tend to agree that a standard of “strict liability” is required. In that view, 
the State’s fault, intent, and apparent knowledge are not necessary conditions for State 
responsibility. Under this standard, Albania would again have been liable for the damages to British 
warships –even if it did not intend to harm another State, citizens, or property of Britain. Under a 
strict liability standard however, a state can be held liable for failure to act, such as when floating 
mines are placed in its territorial waters through which foreign vessels routinely navigate. 
This may also include a State being held liable for an act of its agent or a non-state actor 
within its jurisdiction under specified conditions. 
 
Explaining Attribution, State Responsibility and VNSA in the Post 9/11 World 
 
Can a State be held responsible for the wrongful acts of the violent non-State 
actors within their jurisdiction, and if so, under what condition?  This can only be possible 
through a procedural fiction known as attribution.  In the section below, I examine specific 
conditions for attributing state responsibility in the post 9/11. 
First, what is attribution? It is the direct theory under which responsibility is 
ascribed.  More generally Article 2 of the Act of State Responsibility sets out the required 
elements for the existence of an internationally wrongful act.98 A necessary requirement 
for holding any State responsible for wrongful conduct under this concept is a proven 
relationship between the State and the actual perpetrator of the wrongful conduct. This 
ranges from the most mundane cases to the most complicated.  An important aspect of 
this is that a State is not held responsible for the acts of private individuals.  The State of 
course, is an abstract entity that is unable to accomplish any physical act itself. Just as in 
domestic law, corporations act through their officers and agents, so too under 
                                                            
97 See Corfu Channel Opinion Note 39 above. 
98 See Article 2 …. The UN General Assembly, International Law Commission Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility, Resolution A/RES/56/83 of 12 December 2001. 
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international law, the State acts mostly through its organs, the legislative and executive 
officials.  There is however, a substantive difference between legal consequences of (a) 
attributing a non-State act to a State (for host of reasons that include direct sponsorship) 
and (b) a failure of a State to meet due diligence obligations (e.g., a duty to prevent 
terrorism …… or the unwillingness to hold accountable a non-state actors within the its 
control). In the latter case, the host State will bear responsibility for the failure to exercise 
due diligence rather than being held culpable, i.e., responsible for the act itself.  
When then can the acts of Violent non-State Actors be attributed to a state?   
 
First, the events of 9/11 make this question fundamentally an important one in 
the assessment of attribution responsibility in the general discussion of State 
responsibility. One has to be careful in assuming however, that in the post 9/11 world, 
all else goes. For example, it is a faulty assumption that the sovereign of country A is 
necessarily responsible and therefore liable just because bad guys, a terrorist, a 
revolutionary, or a guerilla group opposed to country B has been given safe haven in 
country A.  As observed in this article, the theory of attribution is in practice a framework 
under which the ascription of responsibility ideally flows under any assessment, the intent 
of which is to impute State responsibility. However, in practice, the result of that 
assessment may or may not necessarily lead to a conclusion worth making attribution to 
country A.   
Before a state can be held responsible for an act of a non-state actor, it is necessary 
to prove a significant causal connection between the injuries caused by the act of the non-
state actor. This is further imputed to the State assumed to have breached its international 
duty or obligations in the specific support provided to, for example, a terrorist 
organization. Such specific support may very well include the provision of safe-harbor to 
the violent non-State Actor. The Nicaragua v United States case in 1985 speaks to the reach 
of state responsibility and therefore set conditions and requirements for making 
attribution of a non-state act to a state.99 According to the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) opinion in that case, in order for an act of a non-state armed group to be attributable 
to a nation State, there must be a showing of an "effective control" of that armed group. 
100 
Ordinarily, the degree to which the act of a non-state actor is attributable to a 
particular State would depend on some key factors. Famously amongst them is one where 
the attribution is clearly established. For example, India’s radical Hindi group invades 
Pakistan from India and kills women and children or a radical Islamist extremist invades 
Israel from Jordan or Lebanon and does the same in Israel. Here the causal connection 
between the injury (killing) and an act committed (invasion) by the Violent non-State 
Actor in both scenarios are unquestionable.  If proven, then the host States (India, Jordan 
or Lebanon) which provided comfort or looked the other way would incur international 
legal responsibility for the conduct of the Violent non-State Actors. This kind of 
attribution is increasingly important today for several reasons.  More than before because 
Violent non-State Actors such as Al-Qaeda, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of  
Columbia (FARC) in Ecuador, multinational corporations, and non-governmental 
                                                            
99 Nicaragua v. United States of America - Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 1986 International Court of Justice 14, 25 International 
Legal Materials 1023 (1986) (Judgment of 27 June 1986). 
100 Nicaragua v United States of America Note 42 above.  
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organizations play variable roles in the international system.  Also more than before, 
governments around the world are at increasing rates farming out to non-state actors 
what use to be traditional State functions. 
In some situations, demonstrating the cause and effect connection may not be all 
that is standing on the way. The initial Act of State Responsibility (ARSIWA) commenced 
in 1950s made a seemingly easy question into a difficult one.101 For example, on the simple 
question “…who bears international responsibility when an armed non-state actor or 
group launches an attack in another country?” Is it the State from which the group 
operates or the non-state actor?  At first blush, ARSIWA Article 1 and 2 seem to provide 
a clear answer. 102  However, on close examination both provisions deal more with 
procedural than substantive rules in addressing which acts or omissions give rise to State 
responsibility for breach of international law.  After seventy years of tinkering, both 
Articles 1 and 2 of the ARSIWA in 2001 were restated in what appeared to specific terms. 
Article l of the 2001 version provides that “[e]very internationally wrongful act of a State 
entails the international responsibility of that State.”103 Article 2 concurs, stating that 
“[t]here is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action 
or omission (a) is attributable to the State under international law;” and the action (b) 
constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.”104 What is unclear in this 
version, however, is the nature of the wrong - the type of wrong that constitutes State 
action versus those that are not. 
Beyond the unsettling aspects of Article 1 and 2, under the 2001 ARSIWA, there 
are five instances from which clear and undisputable State attribution can be made.105 The 
first clearest case of attribution is that of an organ of the State, notably, police officers, 
and the army. Their actions are attributable to the State even in situations where they 
flout orders or deploy orders that exceed authority under the national law.106  Article 7 
makes no distinction whatsoever between the levels of involvement of the particular State 
organ in the scheme of State organizational structure.107 So State responsibility can arise 
from say the actions of a local policeman, just as it can from the actions of the highest 
officials such as the head of state or Secretary of State.  
                                                            
101 See Resolution 799 (VIII) of 7 December 1953. By this resolution the General Assembly 
requested the International law Commission to undertake “the codification of the principles of 
international law governing State responsibility” as soon as it considered advisable.  Indeed, at 
the first session of the International Law Commission in 1949, the question of State 
responsibility was included on a provisional list of fourteen topics which were considered 
suitable for codification, but was not given priority (A/CN.4/13 and Corr. 1-3).  Also see 2001 
version of Articles on State Responsibility, The UN General Assembly, International Law 
Commission Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Resolution A/RES/56/83 of 12 December 
2001. 
102 See Article 2, Articles on State Responsibility, The UN General Assembly, International Law 
Commission Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Resolution A/RES/56/83 of 12 December 
2001 (herein abbreviated as ARSIWA). 
103 See United Nations Legislative Series, Materials on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (ST/LEG/SER B/25, U.N. Sales. No. E.12.V.12).  
104 See Article 8, ARSIWA, see Note 45 above. 
105 See Article 1 and 5, ARSIWA, see Note 45 above. 
106 See Article 7, ARSIWA, see Note 45 above.  
107 See Article 7, ARSIWA, see Note 45 above. 
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Second, Article 5 provides that the rules of attribution cover situations in which 
individuals, not otherwise State organs, are exercising "elements of governmental 
authority.”108 
Third, Article 8 provides that acts of private individuals are attributable to the 
State if those individuals are acting on the instructions of the State, or under its effective 
direction or control.109  
 
Fourth, according to Article 9, in exceptional circumstances in which there is an 
absence of governmental authority, the acts of private individuals may be attributable to 
the State if those individuals perform necessary governmental functions. 110  Lastly, the State 
may incur responsibility even though actions have been carried out by private individuals, 
because the essence of the obligation is to ensure that a given result occurs.  However, 
events discussed below such as the Hezbollah in Lebanon, FARC in Ecuador, and the Al 
Qaida in Afghanistan-Taliban, seem to put in doubt aspecst of the five stated instances 
from which state attribution for responsibilities can be ascribed. 
 
Attributing State Responsibility in Practice 
 
Recent conflicts in Ecuador (with FARC, 2008) and in Lebanon and northern 
Israel (2006), occurring between Nation States and violent non-state armed opposition 
groups on the territory of States that had not themselves taken up arms, raise distinct 
challenges for interpreting international law related to attribution of responsibility under 
the most 2001 version of Act of State Responsibility (ARSIWA, 2001). 
Case in point I: Ecuador-Columbia incident: On March 1, 2008, Colombia attacked 
members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) located within Ecuador, 
killing the group's second highest-ranking member and 21 other militants.111 Colombia 
justified its action under the right to use force in self-defense insisting that State 
responsibility lay with Ecuador, which provided save haven to FARC to launch attacks 
on Colombia. Colombia argued that Ecuador equally failed to meet due diligence 
obligations in preventing the installation of terrorist cells within its territory.  Ecuador 
claimed that Columbia had violated its territorial sovereignty by engaging in hostile arm 
attack with it territory without its consent.   
The Organization of American States (AOS) ruled against Columbia, resolving in 
favor of Ecuador that “the principle that the territory of a state is inviolable and may not 
be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken 
by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatsoever."112 Rejecting any 
                                                            
108 See Article 5, ARSIWA, see Note 45 above. 
109 See Article 8, ARSIWA, see Note 45 above. 
110 See Article 9, ARSIWA, see Note 45 above. 
111 For an in-depth assessment of Colombia root's causes of armed struggle see …. Marco 
Palacios, Between Legitimacy and Violence: A History of Colombia, 1875-200, (Chapel Hill NC: Duke 
University Press, 2006) and Rafael Pardo, “Colombia's Two-Front War.” (2000) 79 Foreign 
Affairs, (4 July/August):64-73. 
112 The principle of non-intervention and the right to territorial integrity are recognized by the 
Charter of the OAS. According to Article 21, "The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not 
be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by 
another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or 
special advantages obtained either by force or by other means of coercion shall be recognized." 
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right of a State to use force in self-defense against terrorist groups located in another 
State without that State's consent (since the OAS resolution does not mention the right 
of self-defense) the ruling place the OAS in collision course with US policy and practice, 
as well as with the UN Security Council's post 9/11 position on the matter.113  In a 
nutshell, that policy considers terrorist violence as a trigger of the right to use force in 
self-defense. Notwithstanding the outcome, the Colombia-Ecuador dispute is part of the 
ongoing controversy in international law about the legality of the use of force by States 
against Violent non-State actors that enjoy safe haven in the territory of other sovereign 
States.  Similar actions had been taken before by other States such as Israel, United States, 
and Turkey as part of response to terrorist threat or the ongoing global war against 
terror. 
 
Case in point II: Lebanon-Israeli conflict: While the facts of Ecuador-Columbia 
incident is one upon which a direct attribution and failure to meet due diligence 
obligations could not stand, a particularly interesting point in the Lebanon-Israeli conflict 
is whether the acts of Hezbollah can be attributed to Lebanon, Syria or Iran, given the 
multitude attribution scheme it presents. Press accounts and Israel’s own view are clear 
confirmation that Israel understands to whom attribution could be assessed in the Israeli-
Lebanese conflict. For example, Steven Erlanger of the International Herald Tribune 
quotes the Likud Party leader Benjamin Netanyahu as calling Hezbollah "an Iranian 
Army division" fighting in a war "conceived, organized, trained and equipped by Iran."114  
The Independent also reported that Israel claimed Lebanon was responsible for the initial 
Hezbollah attack.115 Even if one were to assume that attribution of State responsibility 
cannot adequately be made in light of all available information, it also raises interesting 
questions since Hezbollah and its professed stands against Israel are widely known.116  
Hezbollah’s obvious lack of transparency prompts the question of whether its acts 
are attributable to the three countries - Lebanon, Syria and Iran, or any combination of 
all three States in the attribution of State responsibility for the actions of Hezbollah. 
Assuming that proper attribution is made to Lebanon as the host country (or Iran and 
Syria) then the level of force used by Israel in Lebanon (that resulted in extensive human 
                                                            
113 As the main repository of international law, the UN plays an important role in strengthening 
legal approaches to terrorism and in the respect adopted a number of resolutions condemning 
acts of terrorism. For example, after 9/11 the UN Security Council called on states to take 
action to curb terrorism and established a Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) to monitor 
such a progress. Table 2 provides a listing of United Nations countering terrorism efforts from 
9/11 through 2013. 
114 See Steven Erlanger, “In Late Drive, Israel Seeks Outcome that looks like Victory," (2006) 
International Herald Tribune, August 14, p.5, Accessed June 8, 2017. 
115 See Robert Fisk, “In the face of Bush's Lies, it's left to Assad to tell the truth ….” The 
Independent, August 16, http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/fisk/robert-
fisk-in-the-face-of-bushs-lies-its-left-to-assad-to-tell-the-truth-412046.html, 2006.  Accessed 
June 8, 2017. 
116 An umbrella organization of radical Islamic Shiite organizations, Hezbollah is a Lebanese 
group that opposes the West, and whose avowed purpose to create a Muslim fundamentalist 
State modelled on Iran, and bitterly opposes Israel’s existence.  Hezbollah is believed to be 
responsible for hundreds of attacks since its 1982 inception, which have killed about 1000 people 
(see Council of Foreign Relations <Http://www.cfr.org/Publications/9166>). Accessed June 8, 
2017. 
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casualties and property destruction) may raise further questions relative to how the 
existing international laws of arm conflict applies to the conflict.  This has to do with the 
separate legal principles that govern (1) “the legality to resort to armed force” (jus ad 
bellum) which generally turns on whether the U.N. Security Council has authorized the 
use of force or whether the force is properly used as self-defense, and (2) the regulation of 
“state conduct during of armed conflict” (jus in bello) which turn on whether in using the 
authorized force proper measures were taken primarily to protect civil population or non-
combatants and their property once an armed conflict has begun.  
  
Sanctioned State Practices 
 
An examination of recent state practices reveals a picture different from the 
outcome of the Ecuador-Colombia conflict settled by the Organization of American States 
(OAS) against Columbia. Recall that in that conflict, Colombia was held to have violated 
Ecuador’s territorial sovereignty for failure to seek consent even though a non-state was 
given safe-harbor in Ecuador, from which attacks were launched on Colombia. Recent 
practices go beyond the scope of the international law for attributing State responsibility.  
Under the circumstances presented below, the United States, Israel, and Turkey all used 
and defended military strikes against non-state actors terrorist groups located inside 
other sovereign nations.  
As it turned out, the important difference in the Ecuador-Columbia conflict was 
Colombia’s failure to seek Ecuadorian consent before entering its territorial space to 
strike the FARC forces.  The failure to seek consent according to OAS amounted to a 
violation of the OAS treaty obligation and therefore constitutes a violation under 
international law.  Colombia was at fault, according to OAS, even if it had a legal right to 
self-defense and Ecuador had in fact failed to take effective action to prevent the FARC 
groups from operating within its territories. Thus, the question is not whether Ecuador 
failed to take action against a terrorist group effectively enjoying safe-harbor within its 
territory but whether Colombia’s took all legal means necessary to assert its self-defense 
before invading Ecuador.   Colombia could not argue, for instance, that Ecuador was 
unwilling or unable to deter FARC faction within its territory.  
Below are discussion of facts and circumstance that explain how the United States, 
Israel, and Turkey in similar situation used and defended military strikes against non-
state actors or groups located within other sovereign nations. 
 
Case in point I - United States pre-and post 9/11: The United States launched military 
attacks against suspected terrorists in Sudan in 1998 as a response to the terrorist 
bombings on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.  At the wake of 9/11 and more 
specifically in spring of 2002, the United States again attacked Afghanistan with the 
intent to exterminate Osama Bin Laden, the leader of Al-Qaeda.117  Afghanistan was a 
source of threat, and its territory was either held hostage or being actively used by Al-
Qaeda as safe-haven from which it launched attacks on United States and other countries.  
As impressively documented by the 2004 9/11 Commission Report, Al-Qaeda was 
the entity that launched the 9/11 commercial passenger jet attacks on US soil, killing 
                                                            
117 Thomas M. Frank, Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks 
(Cambridge University Press, 2002) 94-96; Frank M. Franck. Editorial Comment, “Terrorism 
and the Right of Self-Defense” (2001) American Journal of International Law 95(4) 839, 840. 
47
et al.: Volume 1, Issue 2
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2017 19
Pufong: Terror, Insecurity, State Responsibility and Challenges: Yesterda
 
International Journal on Responsibility, Vol. I Issue 1.2 (May) 2018 
46 | P a g e  
 
over 3000 civilians in New York, Washington DC, and Pennsylvania.118  Fallowing the 
theory of attribution in law of State responsibility presented above, would Al-Qaeda acta 
on 9/11 be attributed to Afghanistan, Iraq, or perhaps Saudi Arabia, the nationality of 
most of the 9/11 terrorists? Although the 9/11 Commission Report, issued two years 
later in 2004, confirmed most of what was already known right after the attacks, in 2002 
the US and its coalition of the willing invaded Afghanistan. The US never declared war 
against Afghanistan when it responded with deadly military force within its territory. 119 
That was only part of the story since the choice to invade Afghanistan in particular had 
been furnished earlier by the prior history of the Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on United 
States and its consular services in Africa.  
Indeed, well before October 7, 2001 the United States had claimed self-defense as 
it struck parts of Sudan in a 1998 retaliation against terrorist attacks on US embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania which took place on August 7, 1998.  However, the US self-defense 
claims were supported by a series of UN Security Council Resolutions issued after the 
9/11 attacks and well before it.120  These resolutions condemned the terrorist attacks in 
Kenya and Tanzania as well as establishing an Al-Qaeda and Taliban sanction committee. 
It was this committee that charged the Taliban government of Afghanistan with serious 
violations of international law for its role in providing safe haven to the Al-Qaeda 
terrorist group, training and planning facilities, and allowing the continued use of the 
Afghan territory as safe-harbor for Al-Qaeda. These early resolutions passed in 1998 and 
1999, even though unanticipated, were instrumental as they laid the legal framework for 
the United States-led coalition for the armed incursion into Afghanistan territory in 
response to 9/11th terrorist attacks.  
Thus, as the world public opinion sympathetic to the United States after the 9/11 
increased, new resolutions such as Resolutions 1368 and 1373 (2001) further recognized 
the United States’ inherent right of self-defense under article 51 of the UN Charter.  
Codenamed “Operation Enduring Freedom,” the invasion of Afghanistan had at least 
three major goals: capture Osama Bin Laden, eradicate Al-Qaeda terrorist safe havens in 
that country, and promote regime change in Afghanistan. Thus supported by Security 
Council findings and resolutions condemning Al-Qaeda, a non-state actor, the post 9/11 
resolutions doing the same, and a sympathetic world public opinion, the 2002 US attack 
on Afghanistan was properly within the law of self-defense of the UN Charter.   
 
Case in point II - Israel- Hezbollah conflict in Lebanon 2006: The State Department Bureau 
for Counterterrorism 2013 report presents terrorist attack statistics on Israel that have 
become very ordinary and routine. In other words, people have come to expect the worst 
but from Israel’s perspective it is no laughing matter – the danger of its destruction is 
immensely clear and present every day. It provides for example that some 224 mortar 
                                                            
118 The 9/11 Commission Report is the official report of the events leading up to the September 11, 
2001 attacks commissioned by the President and Congress.  The Commission concluded that 15 
of the 19 hijackers who carried out the attacks were from Saudi Arabia but found no evidence 
the government of Saudi Arabia conspired or funded the attackers. While the leader of the 
attacks, Mohamed Atta, was from Egypt, two were from the United Arab Emirates, and one was 
from Lebanon. All 19 hijackers however, were members of the al-Qaeda terrorist organization, 
led by Osama bin Laden.  
119 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission 
Report.  (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004). 
120 See UN Security Council Resolutions Res #1189, (1998) and #1267, (1999). 
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shells were launched toward Israel in 2013 compared to 2,331 rockets fired from Gaza at 
Israel for the same period. That figure, of course, was up from a previous high of 2,000 in 
2008.  Table 2 provides a list of terrorist groups with an avowed agenda, the destruction 
of Israel. 
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In 2006, responding to a similar attack, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) launched 
an armed attack on Hezbollah, a violent non-state terrorist group within the territory of 
Lebanon, a State that did not take up arms against Israel’s interest.  Specifically, Israel’s 
action was in response to Hezbollah’s capture of two IDF soldiers and the killing of three 
others. Israel’s response would escalate to what became the 34 day long Israel-Hezbollah 
war.121  The question of whether Israel’s actions constituted a well-founded self-defense 
within current State practices and within the spirit and letter of the UN Charter’s Article 
51 is one of interest. Relative to Israel State practice, Amos Guiora reports that even 
before the 2006 conflict, Israel maintained a policy that allowed for repeated target-
killings of Hezbollah, Hamas, PLO and Black September leaders in Gaza, South Lebanon, 
and Syria.122 For a country such as Israel the post 9/11 apprehension or state of 
apprehension is not new.  Israel for one and more than any country, lives under the 
constant threat of an attacked from known or unknown terrorist organizations.123 
By most accounts, the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict (July 12, 2006) began when the 
armed Islamic militant group Hezbollah crossed into Israel and attacked an IDF patrol, 
killing three and capturing two others. While Hezbollah's leader Hassan Nasrallah 
confirmed the capture of the two soldiers he said he was interested in setting up a prisoner 
swap with Israel. Israel’s Prime Minister Ehud Olmert response was that Hezbollah's 
attack constituted an "act of war" on Lebanon, to which he promised Israel’s strong 
response. Israel’s response however, never included asking Lebanon to locate Hezbollah 
nor did Israel seek Lebanon’s consent (as the first step of attributing State responsibility) 
before a formal encroachment into Lebanese territory. The month-long war between 
Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon caused heavy civilian deaths and property casualties in 
Lebanon, Israel, and the Israeli occupied territories, with the lion’s share being in 
Lebanon.  It is possible that having concluded that Lebanon did not have the capacity to 
suppress Hezbollah or Iran and Syria, Israel took matters into its own hands to launch 
the attack into Lebanon. Under the theory of attribution of State responsibility, Israel 
                                                            
121. One source attempt to offer a rational basis for diverse name for the war -- in Lebanon, the 
war is known as the "July War," while many Israelis call it the "Second Lebanon War" (see 
http://www.historyguy.com/israel-lebanon_war_2006.html) accessed January 20, 2017. 
122 For example, on February 1992, Israel killed Sheikh Abas Musawi, head of Hezbollah, in a 
targeted strike against his convoy in South Lebanon. On February 2008, Israel was the 
mastermind behind the targeted killing of another Hezbollah leader, Imad Mugniyah, the 
second in command of the organization, in the heart of Damascus, Syria.  The real argument is 
that targeted killing is a legitimate form of active self-defense in the context of anticipatory self-
defense. As Amos Guiora observe if the decision to target a particular individual is based on 
reliable and corroborated intelligence information and on the premise that no alternatives exist 
including arrest, and the individual being targeted is perhaps a leader whose death will impact 
upon the terrorist organization then the targeted killing is legal. See Amos Guiora “Targeted 
Killings as Active Self-defense.” (2004) 36 Case Western and Reserve Journal of International Law, 
(xx): 319-330 available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=759584. Also elsewhere Hunter 
define targeted as the premeditated, preemptive, and deliberate killing of an individual or 
individuals known to represent a clear and present threat to the safety and security of a state 
through affiliation with terrorist groups or individuals.  See Thomas B. Hunter, Targeted Killing: 
Self-Defense, Preemption, and the War on Terrorism, (Charleston, SC: BookSurge Publishing 2009). 
123 Table 3 listing terrorist organization with mission the express intent the elimination of the 
state of Israel paints the clearest picture of the level of concern Israel must have about her 
security and why she must take offensive measure for its protection. 
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could legitimately have gone after Iran and Syria, the known sources of Hezbollah and 
related terrorist support in Lebanon.  
In the end, reactions by other States and actors as the 2006 incident unfolded were 
generally that Israel was entitled in principle to act in self-defense, but that Israel’s 
actions were disproportionate  in the sense that it did not exclusively target Hezbollah. 
But neither the Israeli official position on its use of force, nor the international 
community’s reactions to it, were clear enough to be conclusively meaningful.  For 
example, the UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006) which ended hostilities124 
called for the full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, [the initial 
resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006)]. These resolutions required the disarmament 
of all armed groups in Lebanon, the withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon (so that, pursuant 
to the Lebanese cabinet decision of July 27, 2006) there would be no weapons or authority 
in Lebanon other than the Lebanese government.125 If anything, the 2006 war and the 
UN Resolution that followed confirmed once again that the Lebanese government was 
impotent and could not either defend or keep others away from fighting proxy wars 
within its territorial space.  
Indeed, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) had done the same in the 
1970s as they moved in and took over southern Lebanon to fight against Israel. The UN 
Resolution 1701 calling for a full implementation of the Taif Accords of 2004 suggests that 
had Israel sought UN permission before intervening into Lebanon in 2006 it would have 
met some difficulties.  At the very least, it is very likely that Israel could have been asked 
to see through the implementation of the outstanding peace accords.  For Israel, the 
alternative route –i.e., the war of July 2006 – did not accomplish much. In light of the 
human and capital damages inflicted on Lebanon, it is likely that Israel’s claim of self-
defense as the trigger for intervention could not have stood scrutiny under the standard 
of necessity and proportionality under the prevailing customary international law.  
The case between Uganda and the Republic of Congo (2006) is also instructive 
here.126  In its assessment of Uganda's claim that its use of armed force within Congo was 
in self-defense, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) observed that "the taking of airports 
and towns many hundreds of kilometers from Uganda's border would not seem 
proportionate to the series of trans-border attacks it claimed had given rise to asserted the 
right of self-defense ....”127 Indeed, most people remained unpersuaded that the customary 
right of self-defense is the strongest in light of its consequences. 
Case in point III - Turkey-Iraqi conflict in Northern Iraq: In 2008, Turkey launched a 
major military incursion into Iraq to attack Kurdish militants of the Kurdistan Worker 
Party (PKK) and killing at least 150 PKK fighters, which Turkey considered a terrorist 
group.  The ground offensive was preceded by Turkish Air Force aerial bombardments 
against PKK camps in northern Iraq, which began on December 16, 2007. This 
constituted the "first confirmed ground incursion" of Iraqi territory since the 2003 U.S. 
                                                            
124 See United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, Adopted by the UN Security Council 
at its 5511th meeting, on August 11, 2006  
125 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1680 (2006) [on implementation of 
Security Council resolution 1559 (2004) on political independence of Lebanon], 17 May 2006, 
S/RES/1680 (2006), available at: http://www.refworld.org /docid/453786a80.html [accessed 
October 16, 2017].   
126 See Congo v. Uganda - Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo in Democratic 
Republic of the Congo 2005 ICJ ___, 45 I.L.M. 271 (2006). 
127 Congo v. Uganda – Note 63 above. 
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led invasion. Turkey’s successful incursion into Iraqi’s territory, which was intended to 
destroy PKK bases, was accomplished with the help of well over 10, 000 troops who took 
part in the operation.128  Turkey's main argument was that Iraq had not been able to 
exercise its authority over the northern part of its country since 1991.129 
The Turkish government argued that a request was made to the Government of 
Iraq to fulfill its obligations under international law to prevent the use of its territory for 
the staging of terrorist acts against Turkey. Thus, while Turkey’s position could well 
have been that because of the failure to act in the part of Iraq, Turkey was then absolved 
of any responsibility for violating Iraqi sovereignty, it contended instead that it had acted 
within the legitimate measures to protect its own security in the face of Iraq's inability to 
exercise authority over the northern part of its country. Thus, the failure to prevent the 
use of its territory as staging ground to launch terrorist acts against Turkey compelled 
Turkey to take the necessary and proportionate actions.130 In a letter dated 24 July 1995 
to the UN Security Council refuting Libya's allegations of Turkey's violations of Iraqi 
sovereignty, Turkey claimed to have resorted to a legitimate measures to protect its own 
security in the face of Iraq's inability "to exercise authority over the Northern part of its 
country" to prevent "the use of its territory for the staging of terrorist acts against 
Turkey.131 
It is important to note that one can only assume the rightness of Turkey’s 
intervention in northern Iraq if one believes that (a) it sought permission and that Iraqi’s 
failure to respond or prevent the use of its territory justified such a military intervention; 
and (2) if one agrees also that the means used by Turkey to attack Kurdish militants of 
PKK and killing 150 of their fighters was proportionate to the harm inflicted by the PPK 
on Turkey.  The logic is self-defeating. 
 
Precedents on Responsibility  
 
By all accounts, the traditional approach to State responsibility for acts of non-
State actors was articulated by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Nicaragua v. 
United States and later in the Iran Hostages judgments rendered by the Court in the 1980s.  
That precedent would later be reaffirmed, be it in a modified form, by the Appeals 
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the 
Tadic case in 1999.  The Court thus has spoken only on few cases leaving the rest to state 
practices which also serve as additional source of law.  
 
Case in point 1 – Nicaragua v United States and Tadic Cases: In the Nicaragua case, 
to establish State responsibility the Court required an effective State control of the non-
                                                            
128 See The Economist. The Kurds: Turkey invades northern Iraq. The Economist. Print 
Edition. Feb 28, 2008 to March 1, 2008, at. 42. http://www.economist.com/node/10766808, 
Accessed June 8, 2017 
129 The Economist March 1, 2008, Note 65 above.    
130 See UN Security Council Doc S/1995/605, 1995. 
131 United Nation Security Council Documents, UN Doc S/1995/605 (1995), “Letter of 24 July 
1995 refuting Libya's allegations of Turkey's violations of Iraqi sovereignty ….” 
http://habitat.igc.org/sc/600-699.html. 
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State actor.132 Thus for example, financing, organizing, training and equipping a group is 
not enough to trigger State responsibility per the standard adopted by the Court.  In the 
end, the US was found to be internationally responsible to Nicaragua but not under the 
“effective control” standard of attributing responsibility to a State. In this case the US 
was accused by Nicaragua for supporting the opposition group, the Contras.   According 
to the ICJ, in order for an act of a non-state armed group to be attributable to state, there 
must be an "effective control" wherein even 'financing, organizing, training, supplying 
and equipping" as well as "the selection of its military or paramilitary targets and the 
planning of the whole of its operation" is not enough to meet the exacting threshold. 133 
However, the 1999 Tadic ruling relaxed the "effective control" standard of 
attribution specifically for acts by non-state military organizations, but still required the 
State’s “overall control” going beyond the mere financing and equipping of such forces to 
also include participation in the planning and supervision of military operations.”134 
 
Case in point 2 – The Iran Hostage Case: Beyond the Nicaragua and Tadic rulings 
noted above, another way in which acts of non-state actors can be attributed to a State is 
if the State acknowledges and adopts such actions after they have occurred. That is, a 
State may incur responsibility, even if those individuals acted on their own initiative. This 
is precisely how the ICJ reasoned in Iran Hostage Case where foreign embassies were 
overrun by mobs and diplomatic staff were taken as hostages by private individuals.135 In 
that case, the Court opined that State Responsibility was extended to the Iranian 
government not only because it conceded the facts, but because “the government 
subsequently adopted the student-driven attacks on the US and Canadian diplomatic 
offices and hostage taking.”136 According to the Court, the Iranian government was 
responsible even if its position and those taken by the student had no affiliation at the 
time the hostage situation occurred.137 Thus, a State may incur responsibility even though 
actions have been carried out by private individuals, because the essence of the obligation 
is to ensure that a given result occurs.  
It is obvious from the Nicaragua, Iran, and Tadic cases discussed here that along 
the way it became evident that the Nicaragua standard for State responsibility became 
extremely difficult to sustain. Attributing State responsibility and therefore culpability 
became difficult to apply even where a State was in fact in the wrong. The International 
Law Commission’s 2001 report codifying customary law titled “Articles on State 
                                                            
132 See Nicaragua v. United States of America - Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 1986 International Court of Justice 14, 25 International Legal 
Materials 1023 (1986) (Judgment of 27 June 1986) 
133 See Nicaragua v. United States of America – Note 61 above. 
134 See The Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia. 14 July 1997. http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-sj970714e.pdf. Also 
see "Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić - Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 2 October 1995. 
http://www.iilj .org/courses/documents/Prosecutorv.Tadic.pdf. 
135 United States v Iran - Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in 
Tehran (United States of America v. Iran); Order, 12 V 81, International Court of Justice 
(ICJ), 12 May 1981, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4023aaf77.html 
[accessed 5 June 2012]. 
136 See United States v Iran, Note 78. 
137 See United States v Iran, Note 78. 
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Responsibility” sought to clarify this point of law in Articles 8 and 11.138  First it 
recognizes the effective control standard for State responsibility announced by ICJ in the 
Nicaragua Case in 1985. Articles 8 therefore asserts the prevailing view of State 
Responsibility relative to acts of Non-State actors by stating that “The conduct of a person 
or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person or 
group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of that 
State in carrying out the conduct”.139  Prior to the adoption of the Articles on State 
Responsibility the conduct of the private individuals were not attributable to the State, 
and Article 8 of the 2001 version of the Articles on State Responsibility prospectively 
remedied that deficiency. With this adjustment made acts of private individuals occurring 
at a point where there is an existing relationship between an individual and the State is 
as 2001 applicable to host the State.140  
 
Second, also complementing Article 8 and providing much needed 
clarity, Article 11 provides that “Conduct which is not attributable to a State 
under the preceding articles (1 through 10) shall nevertheless be considered an 
act of that State under international law if … the State acknowledges and adopts 
the conduct in question as its own.”141  Thus, once the threshold of responsibility 
is met, the act of the non-state actor is considered an act of the State with all 
ensuing legal consequences. 
 
State Responsibility and Sovereignty 
 
There are obvious tension between the prohibitions against the use of force 
(UN Charter 2 (4)) intended to safeguard the political independence and 
territorial integrity of a UN member State and the right to self-defense to protect 
the territorial sovereignty of a member State (UN Charter, Article 51).  The use 
of predatory drones to hunt and to kill Al Qaeda and Taliban operatives, the 
invasion and killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan and the invasion and capture 
of Abu Anas al-Libi in Libya who planed Al Qaeda’s 1998 bombing of two US 
Embassies in East Africa are examples of self–defense par excellence that may 
be complicated by the initial territorial independence or sovereignty violation 
claims.  
 
Case in point – I:  The use of Drones: Ongoing studies by the New America 
Foundation show that between 2004 and 2013 they were 365 reported US drone 
strikes in the northwest Pakistan with 132 of these occurring between January 
                                                            
138 See Articles on State Responsibility 2001, Note 21 and 39 above.  Also see James Crawford 
(2002) [pp.  110-113, 121-123],  The International Law Commission's Articles on State 
Responsibility, Note 21. 
139 See Note 21 above, James Crawford (2002) [pp.  110-113, 121-123], commentary on The 
International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility. 
140 However, the new Articles 8 commentary cautioned that most common cases of the kind 
would arise mostly where a State organ supplements their own actions by instigating or 
recruiting a third party (private persons) to act either as an auxiliary while remaining outside 
the official structure of the State.   
141 See Articles on State Responsibility, ARSIWA Note 39 above. … Resolution A/RES/56/83 
of 12 December 2001 
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and September 30, 2013 alone. According to the New America Foundation, the 
365 drone strikes occasioned approximately 2065 to 3064 individual deaths, of 
whom 1611 to 2787 were described as militants. Non-militant fatality rates since 
2004 through 2013 were approximately 12%, a decrease of 6% from 2012 
percentages.142  The sheer number of US drone strikes alone begs the question 
whether, in the continued war on terror, the US encroached on the sovereignty 
of some other state (Pakistan) in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter? If 
not, at the very least, it raises the question whether under the new post 2001 
Article of State Responsibility, United States must obtain consent of the target 
State (Pakistan) before targeting Violent non-State Actors (VNSA) who engage 
in armed attacks against US military personnel within that country.  
Professor Kenneth Anderson takes the position that the right to use 
targeted predatory drones as weaponry in the war on terror to protect U.S. 
troops from continued Al-Qaeda and Taliban attacks is a valid asserted right 
of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.143 However, seen in 
isolation of any factual determination of US claim for self-defense, the notion 
that the US violated the territorial sovereignty of Pakistan is an incomplete 
assertion. What is necessary is an individualized and factual determination of 
any purported claim of self-defense. For example, UN Article 51 not only 
grants the right to self-defense but also requires proportionality in its 
execution. In the last few years there has been an emerging consensus among 
scholars that an armed attack by a violent non-State actor (VNSA) on a State, 
its embassies, its military post, or on its nationals abroad would trigger the 
right to self-defense, even if such an attack is directed to a safe-harbor in a 
foreign country.144 More recently (2010), Jordan Paust also confirmed that the 
                                                            
142 See The New America Foundation, “The Year of the Drone: An Analysis of U.S. Drone 
Strikes in Pakistan, 2004-2013“ www.Newamerica.net. 
http://natsec.newamerica.net/drones/pakistan/analysis?page=1 Accessed September 14 2013. 
143 See Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law (May 
11, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1415070 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1415070. 
144 See Kimberly N. Trapp “Back to Basics: Necessity, Proportionality, and the Right of Self-
Defense Against Non-State Actors,”(2007) 56 International & Comparative Law Quarterly,(01): 
141-156, doi:10.1093/iclq/lei153; Louis Henkin,  “War and Terrorism: Law or Metaphor,” 
(2005) 45 Santa Clara Law Review, pp. 817, 821; Emanuel Gross, “Thwarting Terrorist Acts by 
Attacking the Perpetrators or Their Commanders as an Act of Self-Defense: Human Rights 
Versus the State’s Duty to Protect Its Citizens,” (2004) 15 Temple International Law & 
Comparative Journal, (36):195-217; Amos Guiora, “Targeted Killings as Active Self-defense.” 
(2004) 36 Case Western and Reserve Journal of  International Law, (xx):319-330 Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=759584; Derek, Remarks, “Self-Defense in an Age of 
Terrorism,” (2003) 97 American Society of International Law Proceeding,pp. 144- 146; Norman 
G. Printer, Jr. ,“The Use of Force Against Non-State Actors Under International Law: An 
Analysis of the U.S. Predator Strike in Yemen,” (2003) 8 University of California Los Angeles 
Journal of International Law & Foreign Affairs 8(Fall/Winter): 331-353; Jordan J. Paust, 
“Responding Lawfully to International Terrorism: The Use of Force Abroad,” (1986) 8 Whittier 
Law Review (xx)pp. 711-729; Jordan J. Paust, “Use of Armed Force Against Terrorists in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond,” (2002) 35 Cornell International Law Journal, (xx) pp. 533-35; 
Jordan J. Paust, “Self-Defense Targeting of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of 
Drones in Pakistan” (2002) 19 Journal of Transnational Law & Policy, (2):pp. 237-279, available 
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use of targeted predatory drones is permissible if done in response to an armed 
attack by VNSA to protect US and NATO troops, and not to engage a foreign 
state or occupy its territory.145 Also, human rights treaties such as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [(ICCPR Article 6(1)] 
and the European Convention on Human Rights [(ECHR Article 2(1)] 
recognize “the inherent right to life” and “prohibit arbitrary deprivations of 
life”146 as well as “allow[ing] for the intentional taking of life when absolutely 
necessary.”147  
Both the ICCPR and ECHR instruments require a State to show, for 
example, that an invasion and/or killing is necessary and that other non-lethal 
options were explored but were not viable. Thus for example, drone targeting 
of Al-Qaeda and Taliban membership does not constitute a violation of human 
rights treaties if actual arrests were difficult or even impossible to execute.   
 
Case in point – II: The Killing of Osama Bin Laden: The US invasion of Pakistan 
and killing of Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan on May 2, 2011 raises several 
important legal and political issues under the international law of responsibility 
and territorial independence.  At the wake of the successful U.S. military 
operation, the Pakistan Government objected to the “unauthorized unilateral 
action” by the United States and cautioned that the event “shall not serve as a 
future precedent for any state.”148 Former President Musharraf also followed 
suite complaining that the operation violated Pakistan’s sovereignty.149 The UN 
Charter Article 2(4) prohibits the use of force against the political independence 
and territorial integrity of a UN Member State. But Article 51 speaks to the 
exception and therefore to the right to self-defense.  Both Charter provisions 
address what in practice are matters of law and state practices.  Beyond the 
                                                            
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1520717, Accessed March 28, 2012; Oscar Schachter, “The 
Extra-Territorial Use of Force Against Terrorist Bases,” (1989) 11 Houston Journal of 
International Law,(02): pp. 309, 311-12; Thomas M, Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action 
Against Threats and Armed Attacks (Cambridge University Press, 2002); Thomas M, Franck, 
Editorial Comment, “Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense” (2001) 95 American Journal of 
International Law (4)pp. 839, 840 ; Jules Lobel. (1999). “The Use of Force to Respond to 
Terrorist Attacks: The Bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan,” (1999) 24 Yale Journal of 
International Law (Summer): pp. 537-547; Sean D. Murphy, “Terrorism and the Concept of 
Armed Attack in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter,” (2002) 43 Harvard Journal of International Law 
(1): pp. 41-52. 
145 See Jordan Paust, “Self-Defense Targeting of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. 
Use of Drones in Pakistan” (2009) 19 Journal of Transnational Law & Policy, (2) (December 8): 
237, 2010; available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1520717.  
146 See the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) [adopted and opened 
for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI)] 
December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976.   
147 See Council of Europe, The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), ROME 4 
November 1950, F-67075 Strasbourg Cedex, http://conventions.coe.int. Accessed June 8, 2012. 
148 Jane Perlez & David Rohd, “Pakistan Pushes Back against U.S. Criticism on Bin Laden,” N.Y. 
Times, May 3, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/04/world/asia/04pakistan.html. 
149 John Bacon, “Musharraf: U.S. Violated Pakistan’s Sovereignty, “USA Today, May 3, 2011, 
http://content. usatoday.com /communities/ondeadline/post/2011/05/musharraf-us-
violatedpakistan-sovereignity/1, Accessed June 8, 2017.  
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trappings of the law and claim of sovereignty, state practices support the 
“unwilling or unable” standard of self-defense as a contemplative limit before 
invasion is executed.150  
As the Columbia-Ecuador conflict in 2008 discussed earlier exemplifies, 
non-State actors including terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda regularly launch 
attacks against States from bases within the State they enjoy safe-harbor. Such 
practices not only violate international law but they are risky undertakings 
which more often than not would instigate retaliatory measures.  However, 
victim-States (such as the United States) are well advised not to undertake any 
action without the consent of the source State. Specifically, any incursion of 
military forces into the territory of the source State would objectively violate its 
territorial sovereignty and formally the UN Charter Article 2(4), which prohibits 
the use of force against the political independence and territorial integrity of UN 
Member States.  The normal calculus for a victim State, who seeks to respond 
with force, is to consider whether to proceed with force on the territory of a State 
with whom it has no conflict.  Absent consent from the host State of the source 
of attack or an authorization from the UN Security Council, international law 
requires that a victim-State assess whether the host State is “unwilling or unable” 
to suppress the threat within its territory. Effectively, a balance between 
sovereignty and self-defense is necessary in that assessment.  
Writing in 1958, Ian Brownlie observed that military actions across 
national frontiers to suppress armed groups, which has been determine to be a 
“source of an attack” and which the host state was unable or unwilling to suppress, 
could be seen as a legitimate form of self-defense.151 In an August 2007 speech, 
then-Presidential candidate Barack Obama reasserted the Brownlie conception 
as he stated that, if elected, his Administration would take action against the 
leadership of Al-Qaeda in Pakistan if the United States had actionable 
intelligence about al Qaeda targets and President Musharraf had failed to act.152 
Obama would later clarify his position, stating that what he said instead was that 
“if we have actionable intelligence against Bin Laden or other key al Qaida 
officials . . . and Pakistan is unwilling or unable to strike against them, we 
should.”153  
                                                            
150 Also see David A Wallace, “Operation Neptune's Spear: The Lawful Killing of Osama Bin 
Laden.” (2012) 45 Israel Law Review, (2): 367-377. doi:10.1017/S0021223712000118. 
151 See Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Activities of Armed Bands,  (1958) 7 
International  & Comparative Law Quarterly 712, 732  for the thread of the argument that  the 
United States was well within its rights under international law to launch an attack into 
Pakistan against bin Laden. 
152 Dan Balz, “Obama Says He Would Take Fight to Pakistan,” Washington Post, Aug. 2, 2007, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com Presidential Candidates Debate Pakistan, Feb. 28, 2008, 
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com /id/23392577/ns/politics-decision_08/ Accessed June 
8, 2012. 
153 Presidential Candidates Debate Pakistan, Feb. 28, 2008, available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23392 577/ns/ politics-decision_08/ Accessed March 28, 
2017. 
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More recently, both Noam Lubell154 and Harold H. Koh155 have also 
recited the unwilling or unable test as the correct yard stick to determine when a 
victim State may take retaliatory measures against non-State actors within the 
territory of another State. The assessment is fact-based and intensive. In 
practice, States such as Israel, Russia, and Turkey are among those who have 
taken liberty of the unwilling or unable doctrine to exercise their self-defense right, 
thus establishing chronological records of contemporary state practices.156 The 
United States invasion and killing of Osama Bin Laden viewed in light of the 
US’s own views and related precedents on the matter also fit well with the 
unwilling or unable test. Here is why: both the Bush and Obama administrations 
took the view that the United States is in an armed conflict with Al-Qaeda. To 
both governments Al-Qaeda undertook an armed attack against the United 
States on September 11, 2001, which triggered the U.S. right of self-defense.  
Therefore given the nature of the enemy and the mayhem caused and 
likelihood yet of another hit, the ensuing conflict extends beyond any particular 
battlefield, be it in Afghanistan, Yemen or Bahrain to wherever members of Al-
Qaeda can be found, as the case Al-Aulaqi v. Obama 2010 makes abundantly 
clear.157 For those who adopt this position, once a state is in an armed conflict 
with a non-state armed group, that conflict follows the members of that group 
wherever they go, as long as the group’s members continue to engage in 
hostilities against that Victim State. The contrarian view is that armed conflicts 
have geographic limits as a matter of international law. That is, such a fact must 
be determined to establish the existence of an armed conflict before all things 
else. 
In light of the United States’ position in the war on terror, the US as the 
victim State had the option of seeking the consent of the source-of-attack State 
(Pakistan) before intervening in Pakistan to capture or kill Osama Bin Laden or 
go at it alone without notifying Pakistan.  It elected the later. The United States 
went after Bin Laden alone, but why? A New York Times piece of May 4, 2011 
suggest that “Pakistani officials were angry about C.I.A. Director Panetta’s post-
fact assertion that Washington did not share advance knowledge of the raid with 
Pakistan because it might have leaked, allowing Bin Laden to escape.”158 Also a 
Wall Street Journal piece of May 5, 2011, confirmed that “U.S. and European 
                                                            
154 See Noam Lubell, Extraterritorial Use of Force against Non-State Actors, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2010). 
155 See Keynote Address “The Obama Administration and International Law,” to the American 
Society of International Law in a Time of Change (Harold H. Koh Mar. 25, 2010) 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm, Accessed March 28, 2012. 
156 See John Bellinger, “Legal Issues in the War on Terrorism,” London Sch. Economics., 
October 31, 2006, at www2.lse.ac.uk/PublicEvents/pdf/20061031_JohnBellinger.pdf, 2006, 
Accessed June 8, 2017. 
157 In Al-Aulaqi v. Obama a ruling favoring the Obama administration, the Court observed that 
“…the fact that the United States’ armed conflict with al-Qaeda exists in one particular location 
does not mean that it cannot exist outside this geographic area” (See, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 
(D.D.C.2010) (No. 10 Civ. 1469). Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
and Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at p.1.). 
158 Allen Cowell,”Pakistan Sees Shared Intelligence Lapse,” N.Y. Times, May 4, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes. com/2011/05/05/world/asia/05react.html, Accessed June 8, 2017.  
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intelligence officials increasingly believed active or retired Pakistani military or 
intelligence officials provided some measure of aid to Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin 
Laden, allowing him to stay hidden just a mile from an elite military academy.”159 
Beyond the obvious lack of trust that one senses, both the New York Times and 
Wall Street Journal sources suggest why the United could neither sought consent 
or shared information with Pakistan before the invasion to its territory that 
resulted in the killing of Osama Bin Laden. 
What exactly constitute unwilling and unable? From the victim-State 
perspective, it simply means whether the host State has demonstrated a clear and 
convincing willingness and is logistically capable or able to suppress the sources-
of-threat from its territory.  For example, in the Pakistan-US relationship during 
the war on terror, many facts should stand out when evaluating Pakistan’s 
willingness or ability of Pakistan to suppress the threat posed by Bin Laden and 
Al Qaeda on either the United States, NATO and Afghan forces, or to the 
security of other States that suffered the 9/11 al Qaeda attacks.  More 
specifically, the victim state must (1) ask the host State to address the threat and 
provide adequate time for the host State to respond; (2) reasonably assess the 
host State’s control and capacity of the threat; (3) reasonably assess the host 
State’s proposed means to suppress the threat; and (4) evaluate prior interactions 
between the victim State and the host State.  It must be understood that for host 
of reasons state practice does not mandate that a victim State such as the US 
seeks the support of the host State (Pakistan) before an invasion is executed. 
Exempted situations include those where a victim State has strong reasons to 
believe that the host State is colluding with the non-state source-of-threat, or 
where asking the host state to take steps to suppress the threat might lead the 
host to tipping off the non-state actor before the victim-State can undertake its 
mission against the non-state actor.160 
Thus, the test just stated is an action-based test that requires a careful 
examination of Pakistan’s conduct in the US initiated war on terror and US 
expectation of Pakistani role in that war.  This also requires an assessment of 
the United States’ perception of Pakistani support relative to the mission of 
finding Bin Laden or the Al-Qaeda operatives. Thus, the purpose of Operation 
Enduring Freedom in “President Bush’s National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism” released February 14, 2003 is worth reiterating as well as its major 
goals: (1) to capture of Osama Bin Laden, (2) to eradicate Al-Qaeda terrorist safe-
havens, and (3) to promote regime change in Afghanistan.161 Pakistan’s 
assistance relative to the stated goals is decisive in any assessment of what 
influenced the United States to go alone after Bin Laden, a decision that might 
stand scrutiny to the conclusion that Pakistan was either “unwilling or unable” 
to fully assist the United States in its mission on war on terror. To both the 
United States and Pakistan there was an undeniable lack of trust which wore 
                                                            
159 See Adams Entous, Julian Barnes & Matthew Rosenberg, “Signs Point to Pakistan Link,” 
Wall St. J., May 5, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704322804576303553679080310.html, 
Accessed June 8, 2017.  
160 See John Bellinger, Note 99 above. 
161 See The White House Office of the Press Secretary, February 14, 2003, http://georgewbush 
whitehouse.archives.gov /news /releases/2003/02/20030214-7.html.  
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down considerably, especially during the declared decade of the war on terror.162 
The bases of such mistrust it has been asserted were often very different and 
conflicting in expectations and national interests.163  
Well before the US intervention and killing of Osama Bin Laden, 
Pakistan had long harbored doubts over whether the United States respected its 
sovereignty.  Pakistan pointed to the fact that US aircraft in transit to 
Afghanistan, flew outside the established air corridor from the Arabian Sea in 
violation Pakistani territorial sovereignty.164  The Pakistani military and its 
Intelligence Service had always been suspicious of the real motives of the United 
States and how a long term relationship with the US would benefit their own 
interest. 165 On the other hand, there is also the observation that the United 
States primary concern has always been whether the Pakistani establishment and 
elements within it, receiving US financial aid, publically proclaimed allegiance 
to US causes while in private acting against US global interests in the war on 
terror.166 Overcoming these suspicions required creating trust in an effort to 
sustain the critical effort of achieving the objectives of the global war on 
terrorism. 
In light of these doubts, the killing of Osama Bin Laden on May 4, of 
2010 signaled to Pakistan that the United States could act alone to defend its 
self-defense interest, especially where it deemed that Pakistan was either 
unwilling or incapable of outsourcing an avowed enemy of the United States. 
The practical effect of US behavior should be seen less as the willingness to act 
with impunity on the territory of a foreign state and more as the share 
brazenness to root out terrorists out who were eager to cause another 9/11 on 
United States before they could do so.  The fact that Osama Bin Laden could 
hide in plain sight of Pakistan's intelligent Services (ISI) reinforced US suspicion 
that privately Pakistan was unwilling to assist the US in the war on terror. The 
other possibility—that Bin Laden perhaps was sheltered by the Pakistan's 
Intelligence is even more terrifying. Yet, it also supports the trustless thesis, that 
Pakistan was not a reliable partner in the war on terror. This is a stronger 
conclusion as US officials in the past had consistently maintained that Al-Qaeda’s 
top leaderships were hiding in Pakistan.  
  Lastly, the invasion and capture of Abu Anas al-Libi in Libya who 
planed Al-Qaeda’s 1998 bombing of two US Embassies in east Africa, similar to 
the invasion of Pakistan, from the US perspective, signaled as the New York 
Times put it “a limit to its patience.”167  Thus, two years after NATO intervention 
                                                            
162 Randall L. Koehlmoos, “Positive Perceptions to Sustain the US-Pakistan Relationship” (2010) 
40 Parameters, (2, Summer):46-57.  
163 See Koehlmoos Note 105 above. 
164 See Koehlmoos Note 99 above. 
165 See Karen DeYoung  “U.S., Pakistan Tread Delicately Toward More Cooperation,” The 
Washington Post, 29 April 2010, A8. 
166 See Reza M. Pirbhai. The Trust Deficit:  US / Pakistani Relations, Then and Now, The 
Global Realm http://www.counterpunch.org/pirbhai05272011.html, June 3, 2011.  
167 See Carlotta Gall and David D. Kirkpatrick, “Libya Condemns U.S. for Seizing Terror 
Suspect,” http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/07/, October 6, 2013; also see Peter Baker and 
David E. Sanger, “Raids Show the Limits of U.S. Military Strikes”  
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that removed Qaddafi from power and waiting for the new Libyan government 
to go after suspected terrorists’ cells in Libya, the US signaled with this invasion 
and capture, its willingness to go alone. 
 
 
Table 3: List of Security Council Measures Adopted on Aspects of United Nations Focus on 
Terrorism, 1999-2014 
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Table 4: International Counter-Terrorism Conventions, Pre and Post 9/11 
 
Table 4                                                   International Counter terrorism  Conventions  Pre and Post 9/11* 
 
Terrorism Convention, Purpose & Date of Passage Summary of Major content of each instrument 
1  Convention  on  Offences  and  Certain  Other  Acts 







2  Convention  for  the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure 


















4  Convention  on  the  Prevention  and  Punishment  of 
Crimes  Against  Internationally  Protected  Persons 
















6   Convention  on  the  Physical  Protection  of  Nuclear 






7  Protocol  for  the  Suppression  of  Unlawful  Acts  of 
Violence  at  Airports  Serving  International  Civil 
Aviation  (1988).            Extends  &  Supplement  to  the 
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8  Convention  for  the  Suppression  of  Unlawful  Acts 
Against  the  Safety  of  Maritime  Navigation,  (1988) 














the  Safety  of  Fixed  Platforms  Located  on  the 
Continental Shelf (1988) (applies to terrorist activities 
on  fixed  offshore  platforms)  (Fixed  Platform 
Protocol) 












































Encourages  States  to  cooperate  in  preventing  terrorist  attacks  by  sharing  information  and  assisting  each  other  in  connection  with  criminal 
investigations and extradition proceedings; and  

























Lessons from Cases, Events and Incidents 
  
State responsibility and State duty today: The lessons drawn are at best 
ambiguous but in the end, one can draw some obvious positive trends from the 
cases, events and incidents presented in this article.   
The first lesson on “self-defense” is that in the post 9/11 world, most 
NATO countries, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the UN 
Security Council have all recognized that terrorist attacks by any violent non-
State Actor located within a State or otherwise, present sufficient enough cause 
to use force for self-defense.  To follow that position Tables 3 and 4 provides a 
detail listing of UN resolutions and explanation in the area of terrorism.  Table 
3 or example provide a listing of Security Council Measures adopted on aspects 
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of United Nations focus on terrorism from 1999 through 2014.  It is comforting 
to see that the United Nation has been in the forefront.  Also, Table 4 is a listing 
of 14 International Conventions and protocols initiated by the United Nations 
dealing with terrorism and related to state responsibilities for combating 
terrorism. 
These conventions and protocols all relate to state responsibilities for 
combating terrorism, and are provided in a familiar format. Typically they: (1) 
define a particular type of terrorist violence as an offence/crime under the 
convention (i.e., the seizure of an aircraft in flight by threat or violence); (2) 
require member State Parties to penalize that activity/conduct in their domestic 
law; (3)identify certain bases upon which the member State are responsible or 
required to establish jurisdiction over the defined offence (territoriality or 
nationality); and (4) create an obligation on member State parties in which a 
suspect is found to establish jurisdiction over the convention offence and/or 
to refer the offence for prosecution if the member state party does not extradite 
pursuant to other provisions of the convention. The last element is the principle 
of no safe haven for terrorists where for example, Security Council Resolution 
1373 of September 28, 2001 mandates the Member State in which a suspect is 
found to establish jurisdiction over the convention offence as an essential 
anti-terrorism obligation on Member States. 
The second lesson is on “State Responsibility” and is on the recognition 
that in spite the seeming prevalence of terrorist acts perpetrated by violent non-
State Actors in the post 9/11, international law requires that victim States act 
responsibly within prevailing rules and practices of international law. What this 
means is that they obtain proper consent before launching attacks against non-
state actors located within the territory of another State. Lastly, that victim 
States be mindful that the failure by host States to terminate terrorist groups' 
activities within their territory or deny safe-haven does not effectively grant carte 
blanche permission to use force. Under the traditional right of self-defense, the 
legality for the any use of force must be established before any action is 
contemplated. That is, where necessary and appropriate, (1) it must be shown 
that the host state is unwilling or unable to reduce or eliminate the source of the 
threat, and (2) all means adopted and damage inflicted must be proportionate to 
the initial harm caused to the victim state, and (3) any use of force is very 
temporary and one that does not result in non-consensual occupation or 
annexation of the State or territory.  To most critics, very little has changed. 
As in the past, the UN Charter continues to limits the use of force to 
collective security however, one that is duly authorized by the Security Council 
as provided under Chapter VII of that Charter.  Under what can be termed as I 
do here as the minimalist view of Article 51, self-defense is justified only as a 
reaction to an armed attack in the most imminent of the circumstances. 
Contrasting the minimalist view is what I also term as the post 9/11 maximalist 
relaxed view of international affairs and especially Article 51. This view holds 
that the Charter does not require that an armed attack is attributed to a State 
actor in order for a victim state to invoke the right to self-defense for retaliation.  
There is therefore no distinction between a State and a non-State actor. The 
problem with the later maximalist view is that attacking a non-state actor within 
another state will almost always require using military operations in the 
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territory of that State. That being the case, if the host state does not grant 
consent, then such any use of force on its territory is an act of aggression, and 
therefore an illegal use of force consistent with UN Charter prohibition.  
The collision course between the harsh reality of the real world fight 
against terrorism and the danger it presents and the rule law is undeniable. Put 
simply, the reality of the current infinite capacity of VNSA to launch armed 
attacks against States defies the continued relevance or the strict adherence to 
Article 51 of the UN Charter. To underscore the point using the Israeli-
Hezbollah conflict in 2006, Israel's use of force in the Lebanese territory was and 
would be problematic. It will be if the acts of Hezbollah cannot be attributed to 
any state or if the acts of Hezbollah are attributable to either Syria or Iran and 
not Lebanon in light of Hezbollah’s occupational history in that country. 
However, in the post 9/11 maximalist view of a relaxed view of the right of self-
defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, Israel's campaign in Lebanon was 
and is legal under international law. 
 
Discussions & Conclusion 
 
State responsibility and State duty in perspective: States unquestionably 
remain sovereign entities whose power to do routine business in international 
affairs are recognized and respected. However, States are less and less the sole 
players on the international scene, and even much less so in armed conflicts. The 
picture this conveys is that States do not have absolute power to control and do 
not have absolute freedom to do as they please. Codified rules of State 
responsibility are clear on this point.  Also, the constraint imposed as displayed 
by international humanitarian laws that structures and limits the conduct of war 
cannot be underestimated. Contemporary application of immunity still premised 
on the 1648 Westphalia understanding of sovereignty which positions the State 
above all orders but its own, is waning at a faster rate.  Yes the State does matter, 
but only on those matters that are essential to statehood and no more. 
The assessment presented in this article shows that current international 
law admits the use of force against terrorist groups which is hardly attributable 
to a specific State. This, of course, is an expansive view and therefore maximalist 
on the matter.  For example, in the post 9/11 world, while the use of force against 
non-state actors in theory is permissible only under certain prescribed 
circumstances, in practice it is far easier to use force today than was the case 
twenty-five years ago. The US killing of Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan in 2011 
is a classic example, and so is the second regroup of US led coalition to after ISIS 
in Iraq and Syria in 2014.  Also the use of drones in Pakistan depended on the 
inquiry into many features of context and appropriate application of principles 
of reasonable necessity and proportionality but shows the ease to which States 
can use force. The ease with which force is used today begs the question for 
further explanation however in context specific situation.  
In the post 9/11 international environment, force can be used in 
particular instances, as in the case where the host State is unable or unwilling to 
repress the non-state terrorist organization operating within its territory.  This, 
of course, suggests that all reasonable measures are taken prior to such a use of 
force.  Also, force can be used when a request for intervention has been made by 
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the international community in order to fight or repel non-state groups within 
the territory of a UN member state. In either case, the degree of force required 
(and used) must be proportionate and necessary to deter the specific source of 
the threat.  
Also as the assessment above shows, State practices also demonstrate 
that in the face of mounting threat posed by a terrorist organizations and for 
which there is a consensus at the international community, it is not necessary to 
demonstrate a link between such non-state terrorist organizations and a 
particular State. This suggests that one or more States can use force against 
another State when the latter gives shelter to terrorist organizations in its 
territory. This of course is the case only when the host State does not signal its 
intent to repress the terrorist threat within its territory despite repeated 
requests to do so by the victim state or the international community.  
The United Nations Charter and the numerous initiatives taken by the 
United Nations since late 1990s (see Table 2) also provides for self-defense 
recourse to be used strictly for such a purpose. If for example, a Member State 
were attacked or invaded by another Member state, the Victim State has the 
right to resort to self-defense as provided by Article 51 of the UN Charter. The 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) has spoken on this matter.  The Victim State 
must demonstrate the involvement of the aggressive State according to strict 
criteria identified by the ICJ and by the International Law Commission. That is, 
where necessary and appropriate, (1) it must be shown that the aggressive state 
is unwilling or unable to reduce or eliminate the source of the threat, and (2) all 
means adopted and damage inflicted must be proportionate to the initial harm 
caused to the victim state, and (3) any use of force is very temporary and one that 
does not result in non-consensual occupation or annexation of the State or 
territory. 
Finally is the case of Failed States, that is, those meeting known 
definitions of failed states used by terrorist organizations as a base from which 
to inflict mayhem on other countries. As shown in the case of Lebanon in this 
article, when State authorities are unable to exercise effective control over part 
or the entire territory, as was the case of Lebanon during the Israeli-Hezbollah 
conflict in 2006, they are fair game for intervention.  And where terrorist 
organizations are operating and using that territory as a launching ground, 
Victim States do not need permission to invade such a sponsoring territory. That 
is, Victim States do not need to seek further approval or meet the strict criteria 
of informing the State harboring the VNSA where the attack is being launch.   
The US killing of Osama Bin Laden, in spite of Pakistan’s avowed 
partnership in the war on terror, is a case in point, and therefore, precedent-
setting in light of the set of facts explaining their prior partnership. The use of 
force is therefore permissible under such circumstances to the extent that such a 
use is proportionate and necessary to deter the specific source of threat from the 
host territory especially where the authorities are unable or unwilling to exercise 
control over their territory or the terrorist group.  In the end, the larger 
prevailing message for accountability and state responsibility is that State 
preferences, be they their sovereign prerogatives or assertions who uphold 
similar rights, cannot operate to avoid adherence to the broader goal of 
international security. 
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